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ABSTRACT
The queue hairstyle that was enforced on all Chinese men for over 260
years in China was, in fact, not a Chinese hairstyle. It can be traced to the
Jurchen tribes north of the Great Wall and became a complex political and
cultural symbol under the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911). The queue
signified many things to different people at different times from its 1645
widespread implementation to its sudden disappearance following the revolution
of 1911. It is in this ambiguity that the queue provides a rich analytical window
through which curious minds can observe sentiments of Ming loyalism, bodily
modification, nationalism, and tradition in late imperial and early republican
China.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The last emperor of China, Aisin Gioro Puyi (1906 – 1967) removed his
braided hairstyle, the queue, in 1922 while confined within the Forbidden City of
the newly formed Republic of China.1 With this action the few remaining queues
within the Forbidden City effectively disappeared overnight, closing the final
chapter of a braided China.

Figure 1,"Puyi's Hair Braid," Forbidden City Weekly, January 3, 1931.
https://www.xuehua.us/a/5eb607d186ec4d2aaddc937b. (Accessed April 6,
2022).
1

The Forbidden City is a massive complex that housed the Imperial gardens,
temples, and living space of the Emperor of China, and was officially known as
Da Nei 大内 during the Ming and Qing dynastic period.

1

What makes Emperor Puyi’s haircut such an important watershed event is the
historical significance that the queue played not only in the immediate period
leading up to 1922, but also the centuries prior. The queue or biànzi was a
hairstyle that belonged to the ethnic Jurchen tribes later called Manchus of what
came to be known as Manchuria in the northeast of present-day China, north of
the Great Wall.2 This queue was an easily identifiable hairstyle that involved the
shaving of the forelock or front and top of one’s head and growing the remaining
hair into a long braid down one’s back, observable through males of the last
imperial dynasty of China, the Qing (1644 - 1911). This hairstyle would be
inseparable from perceptions of China and therefore became a complex political
and cultural symbol under the Qing. Puyi cutting off his queue symbolized a
significant change not only in himself, but also a reflection of China in the early
twentieth century. This change embodied a vision of China that the
revolutionaries and eventually Republicans would use as a standard to rally an
ideal modern society. This standard was one where Chinese citizens joined the
modern world with modern hairstyles.3

For the purposes of this paper, the region of “Manchuria” is taken from
the English colloquial term of the Japanese “Manshu” or home of the Manchus. It
encompasses this north-eastern region of China of which the Japanese puppet
state of Manchukuo would be located between 1934 – 1945.
2

The term “modern” is a problematic and difficult word. For this paper, the
definition is repurposed from the work of Joyce Appleby, Lynn Jacob, and
Margaret Hunt’s Telling the Truth About History (New York; W.W. Norton &
Company, 1994) 201. Modern meaning “the period when reason and science
triumphed over scripture, tradition, custom.” With this definition of modern, by
3

2

Western foreigners who observed the Qing-mandated hairstyles labeled
the queue with beastly connotations. The feminist scholar, Esther R. Berry, has
published extensively on the symbolism and politics of hair throughout history.
Esther writes of the Manchu hairstyle as “derogatorily called cues from the
French ‘queues’ meaning ‘tail’ or ‘pigtail’ – [which] were invested with gendered,
racialized, and sexualized meanings and became ubiquitous with ‘Chineseness’
in the popular white American imagination.”4 This paper’s continual usage of the
word queue is not meant in any derogatory manner, but instead as a signifier to
address the signified object, the queue.5
What made the queue hairstyle so significant was its forced adoption by
Chinese men for over 260 years under the penalty of death. Puyi’s queue
removal is part of a larger cultural shift surrounding ideas of individual and

extension, modernization became “a process that came to mean making
everyone else like the West.” 55.
Esther R. Berry, “The Politics of Pigtails and Pompadours: Chinese Hair
Imports in Turn-of-the-Century Popular American Periodicals,” Feminist
Formations 31, no. 2 (2019): 70.
4

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 – 1913) was a Swiss philosopher who
pioneered late nineteenth and early twentieth century linguistics and semiotics.
Semiotics is the study of symbols and sign and their interpretations or usages.
Saussure’s popular work on sign association had three parts. The first is the sign,
meaning the object that conveyed its meaning. The signifier is the physical
manifestation of the object, such as a sound, color, or image. The third part is the
signified, being the mental concept that the sign refers too. For example, the
word queue in the context of the Manchu braid is a sign. Reading the word queue
invokes a particular image of the hairstyle and not a line or grouping of
something in a uniform matter. For more detailed explanation by Saussure see
Course in General Linguistics.
5

3

communal identity within the Chinese context in the early twentieth century. It
was under this last imperial dynasty, the Qing, that ideas of identity and the body
transformed and took the shape of what can still be recognized even today. The
Qing continually becomes recognized through proponents of the New Qing
History School, a movement that emerged in the 1990s in the United States that
addressed the traditional Sinicization narrative. The Sinicization model or the
process of being absorbed into the ethnic Han Chinese cultural tradition was the
common lens scholars in both China and the West observed the Qing. This lens
was one that nationalistic minded individuals and ethnic supremacist needed to
contend with as new narratives emerged surrounding Qing history. Evelyn
Rawski, a prominent scholar of the New Qing History School wrote “the key to
Qing success, at least in terms of empire-building, lay in its ability to use its
cultural links with the non-Han peoples of Inner Asia and to differentiate the
administration of the non-Han regions from the administration of the former Ming
provinces.”6 This view directly challenged the Sinicization view and
problematized the traditional legacy view of the Qing by those who championed
this model.
The legacy of the Qing was an uncomfortable tale for nationalist, and
ethnic chauvinists alike to retell. The narrative that would have been easier was
one of humiliation and subservience to the backwards and foreign Manchus

Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The
Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History,” The Journal of Asian Studies
55, no. 4 (1996): 831.
6

4

instead of inheritance. The great inheritance of modern China was built
on the precarious relationship between the minority Manchu population over the
majority Han population. These relations both began and ended through the
queue hairstyle, where its abandonment signaled to Han revolutionaries that
China had joined a modern world.
The queue itself meant different things to different people over the
centuries. From its widespread implementation to its sudden disappearance
following the revolution of 1911, the queue provides historians a visible symbol
that can be deconstructed and its shifting and ambiguous legacy better
understood. It is in this ambiguity of meaning that the queue had an identity that
provides a rich analytical window through which sinologist can observe evolving
sentiments. Some of the most prominent sentiments include Ming loyalism,
bodily modification, nationalism, and tradition during late imperial and early
republican China, including among the Chinese diasporas. By following the
queue in the late imperial and early republican period, ethnic identity is revealed
to be a fluid and continuously changing concept, at times being fiercely
contested. This paper attempts to compare the customs surrounding the queue
of the mainland with the experiences of overseas Chinese communities and what
role the queue played up until 1922. By including the experiences of Chinese
abroad, we can see the fluidity of the queue and its relevance for individuals
outside of the reach of the Qing government.

5

In an analysis of the vitality of the body as a site of cultural expression and
political control, historian, Fei Yao, of Shanghai Normal University, notes that
“[t]he body formation in modern Chinese History is inseparable from the flowing
events of those modern times and to truly penetrate modern history, the ‘body’
should be used as a brand-new visual angle.”7 Hair is perhaps one of the
unlikeliest analytic lenses to use when examining historical events, however, it
remains an extremely powerful tool when applied to the context of power and
identity in late imperial and early republican China.
Hair became a means to display the power of the Qing over the majority
Han population. The prominent philosopher of the twentieth century, Michel
Foucault (1926 – 1984), situates power within his concept of “biopolitics,” as the
coordinated cooperation among power relations among living beings.8 In so
being, “[p]ower is defined… as the capacity to structure the field of action of the
other, to intervene in the domain of the other’s possible actions.”9 Foucault used

Fei Yao, “The Haircutting Movement in Modern China (1903 - 1927):
Analysis from the View of ‘Body,’” Frontiers of History in China, 5, no. 1 (2010):
146.
7

8

Foucault, Michel, Michel Senellart, and Graham Burchell. 2008. The Birth
of Biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79. Basingstoke [England]:
Palgrave Macmillan. Michel Foucault’s importance could not be overstated in
power dynamics. His work continues to be one of the most cited within the fields
of psychology and history with regards to power dynamics.
Maurizio Lazzarato, “From Biopower to Biopolitics,” Multitudes,
Philosophy (2000): 4. Maurizio Lazzarato (1955 – Present) is an Italian
philosopher who has dedicated his life in the dichotomy of power. His work builds
and expands on the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault.
9
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the term “biopolitics” to explain “how social and political power is used to
structure and control human life.”10 Foucault “points to a particular phenomenon
in modernity, to point to a new expression of the historical confluence of power
and knowledge.”11 Using the works of this prominent academic authority to define
and understand power dynamics, a consideration of the Manchu braid reveals
important insights to the transition of an imperial to a modern China. The
mandated braided hairstyle by the ethnic Manchus over mainland China provides
a window into the transformative nature of [a] Chinese identity.
Recognizing the queue as more than just a simply voluntary, traditional, or
culturally expressive hairstyle is necessary to complicate the often-problematic
perception the braid itself presented.12 Some fundamental questions about the
queue should be addressed first. Among them are: What is the queue? Where
did the queue come from? What was the role of the queue in relation to a
“Chinese” identity? How did the queue change in meaning from its initial to its
final stage? How does examining the queue in both mainland and overseas

Laurette T. Liesen and Mary Walsh, “The Competing Meanings of
‘Biopolitics’ in Political Science: Biological and Post-Modern Approaches to
Politics” (American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA,
2011), 1.
10

11

Liesen and Walsh, 6.

12

This hairstyle is termed simple to note that unlike shorter hairstyles that
can be deemed as higher maintenance. This stems from more frequent upkeep
required to maintain the hair short, whereas the queue can be easier to style
once a pattern is in place. One example is in the crown line where a clearly
visible area is present for the one doing the haircutting and later braiding the
remaining hair.
7

Chinese diasporas explain the fluidity and complexity of Chinese identity?
How does a close examination of the queue hairstyle explain the Qing and
modern Chinese applications of biopolitics? How did the dynamics of Chinese
identity in the Qing dynasty, especially as seen through the queue hairstyle,
shape modern Chinese political concerns into the twentieth century? What role
did the diasporic experience have regarding masculinity and gender roles as
opposed to within mainland China? After an examination of relevant academic
literature, these questions will be the focus of this study, leading to an
explanation of the queue as a site of Chinese cultural construction and state
power.

Literature of the Field
Qing history continues to grow with rich archival studies from both foreign
and Chinese scholars. This section will focus primarily on English-language
scholarship of Qing history, particularly on works that have examined the
importance of the Manchu queue hairstyle either directly or indirectly. In addition,
this section will present relevant theory surrounding masculinity and critical
disabilities studies as they pertain to the Manchu queue. The existing literature
that provides the most impactful analysis surrounding the Manchu queue in the
past century takes different and rich approaches. The University of California,
Berkeley’s Frederic Wakeman Jr.’s work comprised some of the first Englishlanguage scholarship to narrate the complexity behind the Manchu conquest of
China, notably his two-volume work, The Great Enterprise: The Manchu
8

Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China. Wakeman calls
the Ming-Qing transition of the 1630s and 1640s “the most dramatic dynastic
succession in all of Chinese history,” and he demystifies the journey of the
Manchus in obtaining the “Mandate of Heaven,” or the traditional cosmological
legitimacy bestowed upon righteous dynastic founders.13 Wakeman
demonstrates the importance the queue had for the Manchus during their
conquest of China as well as to the Chinese population that did not traditionally
adopt this specific tonsure practice. Wakeman avoids the prior trend within the
field of Chinese historians of overlooking the queue in the Manchu conquest, and
instead places the queue centrally within the Qing narrative, even going so far as
to amplify the sentiments of Ming loyalists in resisting it. Wakeman does this by
noting the queue was instrumental in resistance, surrenders, and compromises in
the coming Qing conquest. One example Wakeman uses is how even in the later
Qing conquest of the Southern city of Nanjing, Han resisters even pleaded with
Qing forces to “change its stance on the [queue] issue” because Ming men would
see hair cutting as a barbaric and uncivilized act.14 The Ming Dynasty (13681644) that preceded the Qing had been ruled by ethnic Han Chinese, that is, of
the majority ethnic group comprising about 90 percent of the Chinese population.
It is the aspect of Ming loyalism that this paper expands on, especially as this

13

Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction
of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986), 1.
14

Wakeman, 649.
9

movement moves through stages following the changes the queue itself
symbolized. In using Ming-loyalism this paper refers to the sentiments of loyalty
or longing towards the Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644). This is a highly fluid term
that encompasses a wide difference of sentiments including but not limited to,
ethnic superiority, ethnic state supremacy, Han chauvinism, and anti-Manchu
racism in which this paper will later expand on.
The relationship between the ethnic majority Han population and the ruling
minority Manchus in the late Qing and into the republican period (1911-1949) is
best examined through Edward J.M. Rhoads’ Manchus and Han: Ethnic
Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861 –
1928. This work goes further than exploring sentiments of Ming-loyalism and
provides an examination of the ethnic relationship and tension that had existed
between the Han and Manchu populations especially surrounding the 1911
revolution that ended the Qing and ended Manchu rule. Rhoads emphasizes the
idea of anti-Manchuism, providing convincing analysis that anti-Manchuism and
Ming-loyalism were both fluid concepts, existing both together and separately in
different forms with different levels of intensity. Rhoads defines anti-Manchuism
as “ethnic opposition among China’s Han majority toward the alien Manchus,”
especially in the era following the Boxer uprisings. He reveals the intense fervor
towards ethnic Manchus in which the queue played an important part, and notes
that this played a role in motivating the revolutionaries in the bloodshed of the

10

1911 revolution.15 This anti-Manchuism is a particular point this paper
problematizes by examining the queue-cutting events that occurred in the period
surrounding the 1911 revolution.
In The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and
Symbols in China, 1911 – 1929, Henrietta Harrison examines the oftenoverlooked importance of evolving rituals during the early Republican period.
Harrison tackles the meaning of identity and does so by “describ[ing] how the
new concept of Chinese identity grew out of the changes of the early twentieth
century.”16 Locating the pivotal and formative moment for Chinese identity in the
final years of the Qing, Harrison’s analysis is precise and thorough, and forgoes
with misguided and essentialist notions of an eternal, unwavering, and enduring
Chinese culture. Her text addresses the faults of scholars who attempt to “fit all
responses to the republic into a single framework,” and looks closer at the
“changes and culture” instead of only the political debates as often is the case.17
In examining the hairstyle, Harrison brings to the surface the cultural presentation
of the revolutionary elites and what queue cutting signified at the time of, and

15

Edward J.M. Rhoads, Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political
Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861 - 1928 (Seattle and
London: University of Washinton Press, 2000), 11.
16

Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political
Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911 - 1929 (Oxford; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 2.
17

Harrison, 4.
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immediately following, the revolution for a “new Republican citizen.” In addition,
Harrison digs deeper into looking not just at the decision makers of the revolution
and new Republic, but also the local context and how the common person
perceived the changes, both willingly and forced, surrounding their bodily
autonomy. By also looking at the local level, this work also helps to break down
barriers in analysis between rural China and the urban centers, and especially
between upper and lower classes.
Michael R. Godley provides perhaps the most concise and direct scholarly
analysis of the queue itself in “The End of the Queue: Hair as Symbol in Chinese
History.” Godley suggests that the removal of the queue, did not mean “that a
queue-less China should mean a new China” as in the words of the North-China
Herald in 1910.18 Instead Godley suggests that as some accepted the queue in
the seventeenth century and others did not, calls arose for a reexamination of
how the queue is perceived.19 This is further problematized when Godley
presents the complexity of the queue identity when the Manchus themselves
eventually no longer advocated for their braided hairstyle after the revolution. In
fact, Godley even posits the challenging idea that ultimately, by adopting

Michael R. Godley, “The End of the Queue: Hair as Symbol in Chinese
History,” Papers on Far Eastern History Number 8, no. December (1994): 53.
18

19

This reexamination that Godley calls for is one that this paper answers
is bridging the existing historiography of Qing and early Republican China. In
addition, a combination of the mainland and the diaspora in the US and Mexico
further complicates the simplicity that has become prevalent in queue
discussions.

12

hairstyles that were “modern” and considered by some to be Western, the
Chinese population “substituted one foreign hairstyle for another.”20 This is
noteworthy since there was not a widespread reversion to the long hairstyles of
the Ming, even by those heralding Ming loyalism.
In “Control, Allegiance, and Shame in Male Qing Dynasty Hairstyles,” a
Master’s thesis by Carolle Pinkerton looks at the politicization of hairstyles in
imperial China, specifically analyzing what she terms “hair martyrs” who would
not obey the queue edict of 1645 and beyond.21 This work properly situates three
periods of law in 1392, 1645, and 1912 in which the queue is contextualized
within a state-sponsored method of control. In addition, the work of the
magnificent Chinese author of the early twentieth century, Lu Xun (1881-1936),
as well as the experience of the Chinese abroad is also important to Pinkerton’s
analysis, contributing to a more complete narrative than previous examinations of
the subject. Lastly, Pinkerton rightly presents the Ming hair edict of 1392 to show
a systemic “return” of Han society to the emperor’s perceived ancestral custom.
This is an important note of anxious feelings of the Ming (1368 – 1644), who
continually were weary of their Mongol predecessors, the Yuan (1279 – 1368).
By analyzing these various edicts further, this paper examines how they relate to
the diasporic experiences of not just San Francisco, but New York and Mexico.

20

Godley, “The End of the Queue: Hair as Symbol in Chinese History,” 72.

Carolle A. Pinkerton, “Control, Allegiance, and Shame in Male Qing
Dynasty Hairstyles” (New York, The City University of New York, 2022), iv.
21

13

Including these additional regions of the Chinese experience, similarities
between the evolving nature of the queue can be compared to the mainland
experience.
A century into Manchu rule, the era often referred to as the High Qing
enjoyed what was in many ways the greatest period of prosperity in Chinese
history. Though prosperous, levels of Qing society were not equitable throughout
the Qing empire. Philip Kuhn’s Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768
cuts into this prosperous period of the Qing and examines the superstitious event
he calls “soulstealing.” The local population in the Lower Yangtze region was
suspicious and increasingly fearful of wanderers such as beggars and monks
who were rumored to be clipping the end of Chinese males’ queues and casting
spells to trap their souls. This superstition led to the mass beatings and arrests of
migratory people, causing the Qianlong Emperor himself to get involved. Kuhn
sets the stage for the economic, philosophical, and regional approaches of the
Qing in maintaining state-sponsored order in a period of prosperity. Kuhn places
the queue directly center to analysis of governmental and societal control.
Understanding the resistance to the Manchu queue a century earlier, compared
to panic over unwanted queue clipping during the sorcery scare, illuminates a link
and an unnamed phenomenon for which this paper borrowed from Eric
Hobsbawm: an invented tradition. The queue had become an inextricable if
ambiguous part of a Chinese man’s body and identity, and one over which there
was great anxiety about its violation.

14

Eric Hobsbawm’s The Invention of Tradition cuts deep into the heart of the
cultural and political matters in a way that is useful in an analysis of the Manchu
queue. Perhaps no other explanation is as compelling to explain how the queue
went from violently resisted hairstyle to eventually one that was widely
considered a part of Chinese identity. Hobsbawm defines the terms as “a set of
practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”22 The queue and
shaven forelock was invented as a tradition for the Han Chinese because it was
not a custom that had been readily practiced before 1645. Its implementation
was a symbol to the Qing for those who accepted Manchu rule, and those who
did not, especially by those party to Ming-loyalism. Queue wearing did not
immediately become a part of the Han cultural tradition, unlike the Manchus and
the Jurchens given the twelfth century attempted implementation as will be
explained below. It was through the generations when the queue would be
largely adopted by the Han Chinese “by [the Qing] imposing repetition.”23 This
queue origin as a symbol of subservience would fade after the centuries to some.
This is revealed in the decision to wear false queues among Chinese diasporas
and by the larger population when the revolutionaries toppled the Qing

22

Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.
23

Hobsbawm and Ranger, 4.
15

government in the 1911 revolution. Instead, some Han individuals refused to cut
off their queues, seeing it instead as not only part of their identity, but part of their
larger ancestral custom reinforced by neo-Confucian ancestral reverence. By
using the concept of the queue as an “invented tradition” this paper brings
together the pieces of historiography surrounding the queue and taps into an
often-elusive definition of what the queue meant to Chinese identity both within
China and overseas. This complicates the simple anti-Manchu narrative of the
revolutionaries who would become republicans, and who steered the direction of
the queue’s memory.
The most recognizable event prior to the 1911 revolution that could be
universally identified with the queue, or lack thereof, is in the Taiping Rebellion
(1850-1864). Jonathan D. Spence’s, God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly
Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan provides a rich narrative of the movement from cause
and context to its ultimate end. Spence illustrates the religious fervor of the
Taiping movement, in which they would be known as the “Long Hairs” because of
their refusal to wear the queue and shave their forelock as mandated. The name
referred to the rebels’ growing forelocks, which could be measured to gauge how
long they had been part of the rebellion to outside observers. By observing the
outward appearance of the rebels, ideas of identity and tradition are better
connected. The queue as observed through the Taiping movement provides the
intensifying catalyst for the coming sentiments of a queue-less society.

16

Mexico further expands our understanding of the experiences of the
Chinese and the queue, particularly for its proximity to the US. By looking both
within the US and beyond at the wider Chinese diasporic experience, this paper
demonstrates that outside of China, the queue continued to be an easily
identifiable characteristic of Chinese males in different communities. Robert
Chao Romero looks at the social history of Chinese immigrants in Mexico with
The Chinese in Mexico, 1882 – 1940. Romero posits that the American Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 enabled Chinese individuals to expand the “Chinese
transnational commercial orbit” that “involved a multinational socioeconomic
network spanning China, Latin America, and the United States.”24 The songs and
cartoons published by the local population in Mexico are comparable to the US,
showing similarities in perceptions of the Chinese and their queues. Their queues
not only identified the Chinese in Mexico but also in the US to the north.
Any work that explores the search for modernity within the Chinese
context is incomplete without Lu Xun (1881 - 1936), widely considered the father
of modern Chinese literature. Some of Lu Xun’s short stories include the queue
as a key identifying characteristic for characters within the narrative. One tale,
“The Story of Hair”, can be seen as a direct allegory to the communal memory of
the queue. The queue also figures prominently in “Remembrances of the Past”,
“A Passing Storm”, and “Ah Q – The Real Story”. Scholarly work on Lu Xun often
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analyzes one or two of his short stories together. In contrast, considering these
four stories together presents the communal memory of the queue through Lu
Xun’s eyes. Examining the memory of the queue reveals just how significant a
role the queue played in the recent memory to figures like Lu Xun who lived
during the Qing and also the early Republican period. This remembrance
demonstrates not only the importance of the then living memory, but also in the
echoes of the Chinese in their immediate past.
The queues of the living are naturally an important matter, but the queue
of the deceased are also a subject worth consideration to the larger historical
narrative. The Confucian ancestral worship practices deserve further analyses,
and should not be dismissed, especially regarding the Chinese diasporic
experience. In Chinese American Death Rituals: Respecting the Ancestors, Sue
Fawn Chung and Priscilla Wegars center the narrative of the queue within the
American diasporic community. Chung’s and Wegar’s presentation of the queue
within the burial rituals centers how examining the dead gives more answers to
life. This is done by examining how identifying characteristics of the Chinese
body, such as hairstyles, were important to traditions surrounding the customs of
identity in the afterlife.
This paper’s goal is not to impose a fabricated connection where some
may argue none appear. That is, to say that the queue is a worthy subject of
further discussion and not one to be dismissed as a mere symbol of Manchu
subservience. This paper takes the position against narratives that favor the
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relegation of the queue to a minor page in Chinese history. To combat this, the
connection of the queue needs to challenge traditional western approaches in
connection to historical writings on China. Perhaps no other text better provides
the historiographical setting than Paul A. Cohen in his Discovering History in
China. This text provides a theoretical approach to how the scholarly literature in
China has been written by American scholars. The queue is perfectly suited to
challenge some of these pre-existing views, problematizing the traditional way
that the queue had been presented, applied, and continually shared. This
challenge demands a close study of the queue within a China-centered analysis
that incorporates the complexity of Manchu-Han relations in the Qing. This
Manchu-Han relation then influenced and was influenced by the diasporic
community, situating the queue as existing outside of western centric approaches
on the usual fronts: the impact-response approach, modernization approach,
imperialism approach, and China-centered approach.
The impact-response approach challenges the traditional view of seeing
the impact of the West and Chinese response to this Western Impact Model. This
view was predominantly practiced by Harvard historian John Fairbanks and
others, a method of Western influence awakened a stagnant and slumbering
China. This is to say that the West that encountered China invoked a specific
response from China to appropriately tackle the challenge of places like the US,
Japan, and Europe. A major drawback of this view is the frequent simplification
and overt narrative that the Chinese response is seen as “a kind of adding up
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and averaging that can at best lead to a homogenized perception of historical
reality; at worst, in moving recklessly from the particular to the general, we risk
distorting this reality altogether.”25 Cohen provides the example of the Taiping
movement as one example. His perception is that American historians view that
the most revolutionary aspect of the rebellion was “its ideological and
organizational structure.”26 Contrary to this perspective, this paper views the most
revolutionary aspect on the body, specifically the anti-Manchuism that was
evident in the Taipings’ lack of a queue and their re-growing of their forelocks
(hence their nickname of the “Longhairs”).
A second and related major trend in historiography on China that Cohen
examines is the “modernization” approach, in which Western societies viewed
China as stagnant and unchanging for millennia, similar to the “Western Impact
Model,” since China was only awakened to modernism by the arrival of Western
and Japanese imperial forces. This is an especially powerful fallacy and it is
necessary to debunk “the image of China as a static, unchanging society, a
society in a perpetual repose.”27 In using the analytical approach to challenge this
narrative, the queue demonstrates over China’s longue durée that China was
constantly changing. A student of these earlier approaches that had been shaped
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in part by John Fairbank and Joseph Levenson, Frederic Wakeman, as noted
above, aimed to demonstrate that the Ming-Qing transition brought a drastic
change, particularly in the complex realm of Chinese identity. He further noted
that the Qing conquest was just one of many profound and thorough ruptures
(the founding of the Yuan, then the Ming conquest, not to mention earlier
dynastic transitions), that challenge the simplistic view of a stagnant and
unchanging Chinese cultural and political world. This would be a project that
Wakeman would ultimately undertake up to the time of his passing.
The third view, the Imperialism approach views the role that the West
alone “could create the preconditions for massive change in Chinese society.
Having created these preconditions, however, it proceeded effectively to block
any and all changes that were not in its interest,” as positioned by Cohen.28 This
is a direct response to the modernization approach as lacking, that it failed to
look at the role of imperialism played in “the last 150 years of Chinese history.”29
The role of imperialism is the missing link that proponents of this theory
champion, seen as the lacking piece in the previous two models. The West in this
view is the one that China could not on its own bring about meaningful change
that was favorable to the imperialist powers. In effect, this view maintains that the
West is still present in the role of emerging change of identity, often the center
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focus behind this change. The queue challenges this perspective demonstrating
how resistance and change existed long before the Qing, and would continue to
exist, at least in the eyes of revolutionaries, after the Qing.
The China-centered approach does exactly that, by establishing a Chinacentered position.30 This became viable as Chinese archives were opened to
Chinese and foreign scholars in the reform era after Mao Zedong’s (1893-1976)
death. This perspective places the thoughts and experiences of Chinese
individuals at the center of the analysis and resulting narratives, rather than a
perspective that considers China dormant, a cordial view of traditional Western
narratives. The complexity of the queue provides a narrative that challenges the
dominant and cordial Western view that has existed in long standing
perspectives. A China-centered approach amplifies that the queue is more than a
sentence on a page of Qing history. It complicates this simplicity, by looking from
within at the Chinese experience, through archives, oral interviews, and personal
accounts that had been unavailable to most Chinese and foreign scholars during
the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). When considered
alongside a diasporic experience, the queue becomes one beacon to
demonstrate that the narrative of identity is continually fluid, mirroring how
identity itself is fluid. It is this fluidity that follows the trend of disruptions in
Chinese history and is elusive if the narrative sought is simply one that the queue
is nothing more than a symbol of subservience to the Manchus. It is perhaps the
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ubiquity of the queue that has caused it to fade into the background of Chinese
history, but with the emergence of “New Qing History” in the 1990s, the last
imperial dynasty of China has been considered much more closely on its own
terms. Yang Nianqun, a prominent figure from Renmin University of China’s
Institute of Qing History spoke on the impact of this new approach to the last
dynasty, “[it] has created an atmosphere of exploration completely at odds with
the old Qing history.”31 This exploration allows the period of China’s entrance to
modernity predate the traditional nineteenth century view and is stretched with
more clarity to the seventeenth. This shift of beginning “modern” China is one
example of New Qing History view that bore fruit in Chinese imperial review.
This paper utilizes the meticulously compiled selection of disability studies
theory of the Professor of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at
Chicago, Lennard J. Davis. Davis compiled a rich selection of works that provide
a brief but concise and wide-ranging perspective on disability in The Disability
Studies Reader. Two subjects are of particular note when contemplating the
mindset of Chinese individuals on the significance of the queue: masculinity and
disability. Davis provides the theoretical framework necessary to situate how
stigma and perceived gender roles influence how society considers disability,
even demonstrating the fluid nature of a disability. Using Davis’ selection of
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theory on the Social Disability Model, this paper strives to demonstrates that the
societal factor surrounding the queue played a large role in the establishment of
a Chinese identity.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE JURCHEN QUEUE

The Chinese and the Barbarian
Hair is a “border substance,” existing on the periphery of the body, able to
be removed or altered without causing physical pain to the host.32 The substance
of hair became the method of control that was imposed onto Chinese male
bodies, because while it may not have imposed physical pain, the emotional and
social pain that emerged by the forced adoption of this hairstyle did invoke a real
psychological pain. This pain revolved on the presentation of hair not considered
Chinese due to the long-standing practice of fluidity between those who were
considered Chinese (in Chinese, Hua), and those who were not or “barbarians.”
This relationship in Chinese history is commonly known as the Huá-Yí [華夷]
discourse or Sino-Barbarian dichotomy. Huá was the understood cultural
measurement of the Chinese population with Yí frequently referring to those
outside of this cultural sphere.
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Figure 2. “The People's Republic of China and its Claimed Territories,” Wikimedia
Commons, October 30, 2008.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:People%27s_Republic_of_China_(ortho
graphic_projection).svg (Accessed April 5, 2022)

Chinese identity was an abstract construction, generally referred to those
belonging to the Han ethnic group, which today comprises about 90 percent of
the population of the PRC. Over time, the construction of Chinese political
identity included other ethnic groups such as Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and even
Tibetans eventually being the five races represented by the flag of the Republic
of China in 1912. The Republic of China (1912 – 1949) immediately followed the
end of the Qing. The ending of imperial lineages after two millennia in China was
a transformative process brought about by largely Han ethnic nationalists wishing
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to create a Han ethno-state. These nationalists, whom will be referred to as
revolutionaries and republicans, envisioned a queue-less society for their newly
formed Republic, and one without Manchu rulers, which was evident in course of
the revolution and the policies they would implement.33 This Republic was
founded on the Sino-Barbarian relationship, one that can be observed throughout
the previous dynasties and after the creation of a Chinese Republic.
The anxieties of the educated elites of the majority Han population
subjugated to minority rule by an ethnic “other” or “barbarian” provided a target to
focus rising feelings of discontent, animosity, and racism by revolutionaries and
founders of the Republic. The educated background of these elites provided the
opportunity for anti-Manchu sentiments to be sharpened and transmitted to the
less educated classes. This transmitted sentiment did not only extend to Han
population, as this paper will later address with an ethnic Hakka lead movement.
It was however the ethnic Han revolutionaries that would ultimately be successful
with their founding of the Republic. The continuing collapse of the Qing dynasty
by both internal and external forces presented Han chauvinists the opportunity to
target the Manchu identity of the Qing rulers and challenge them to place ethnic
Han Chinese once more into power. The Manchu and Han discourse of 1911
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would resurface arguments coinciding with Ming dynastic loyalism from over two
centuries earlier, and fuse with a new strain of anti-Manchuism.
This ethnic discourse is central to the understanding of the 1911 revolution
that ultimately brought the end of Qing imperial rule over Tianxia or All-UnderHeaven (the cultural and historical realm of China). The physical identity of both
Manchus and Han is clearly observable through the queue and became the
marker of ethnic discourse. The bodily control exhibited in queue wearing from
the Jurchens (ethnic predecessors of the Manchus) and later Manchus and the
Han ethnic groups is a necessary avenue to examine the modernization of China
in the early twentieth century.
As the Western nations became “modern” these political entities frequently
labeled the East or “Orient” as an exotic and romantic place.34 Countries such as
the United States, Mexico, and England conceptualized ideas of the “East” and
often developed preconceived notions for those not considered Western or
modern. As contact with Chinese bodies grew, often through trade relations, this
exotic and romantic perception shifted to one of heightened femininity and
backwardness by the West. It was through this heightened femininity by the West
that the queue was seen as Chinese and therefore linked long hair with
femininity. Therefore, observing the human body as the engine that drove identity
during the transition period of China’s Ming dynasty, Qing dynasty, and early
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Republican period, historians can better understand the fluidity of bodily identity.
Centering the aspect of the body relative to identity requires an examination of
the physicality of tradition, and how cultural contact connected one ethnic group
to the other.

Origins of the Cross-Cultural Queue
French Historian and founding member of the Annales School of History,
Marc Bloch (1886 – 1944), theorized that historians suffer from “the obsession of
origins.”35 Bloch was skeptical of the excessive preoccupation of scholars with
the origins of a culture, artifact, or idea. This obsession of origin seeks an original
source and might ignore the contingency and reinvention that artifact or idea or
culture had undergone since its origin, while still maintaining the same names or
symbols. Contemporary scholars should seek to find and understand the origins
of a given phenomenon, while also understand its ongoing reinvention and
restructuring.
Given that contact between groups north and south of the wall has existed
for millennia, this paper points to a specific intersection between the ethnic Hans
and the precursor to the Manchus, the Jurchens, centuries before the founding of
the Qing dynasty. Ethnic Jurchens were an agricultural group of tribes of the
steppe in the region that is the northeast of present-day China. Their custom of
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an easily identifiable hairstyle that involved the shaving of the forelock or top of
one’s head and growing the remaining hair into a long braid down one’s back is
today known in the West as the Manchu queue.

Figure 3. Kiu, Uan "Jin Dynasty 1141," Wikimedia Commons, November 6, 2019.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jin_Dynasty_1141_(no_borders).png
(Accessed April 5, 2022)
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The strongest interaction between pre-Qing Jurchen cultural heritage and
its impact on Chinese culture occurred in the early twelfth century with the
Jurchens of the Jin Dynasty (1115 – 1234) and the Han of the Northern Song
Dynasty (960 – 1127). It should be noted that this specific hairstyle was a male
worn style, and females did not adopt it.36 Given the patriarchal norms that
dominated the Confucian societies of the most Chinese dynasties, it is no
surprise that observing this hairstyle in Chinese tradition follows gendered
experiences with interpretations and perspectives often given by the educated
male elites in Chinese history. This is especially understandable since most
family resources to education were invested in a man instead of a woman.
However, by recognizing that both Han men and women practiced body
modifications, contemporary scholars can better understand the importance the
human body had on Chinese cultural traditions.

Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding
(California: University of California Press, 2005), 110-128. Females did have their
own body modification traditions that existed outside of the queue. For one
example, consider the foot binding tradition of Han women. A practice often said
to originate in the twelfth century that saw the breaking of the foot of young
females and bind it either with a wrap or bandage to purposely have smaller feet.
This practice was also known as “lotus feet” and reinforced societal ideas of ideal
beauty standards within a Chinese community. Note that this practice, like the
queue, was not uniform. Hakka women, those belonging to the ethnic group of
the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion did not practice foot binding, neither did the
Manchu women. It is not altogether surprising that Ko argues that the erotic
sentiments of foot binding reached their peak in the seventeenth century, the
same century that the queue was implemented onto Han males.
36
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Figure 4. Hofmann, Jos. “Chinese Girl with Bound Feet.” Photograph. San
Francisco: Chinese Customs – Indelible Photographs, 1892. From Wikimedia
Commons.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Chinese_girl_with_bound_fee
t_(cropped).jpg (accessed February 11, 2022

If the queue was the physical bodily marker of who was considered
“Chinese” before the modern era, then the Great Wall was the northernmost
geographical marker. This was reinforced by New Qing History scholars who
recognized the steps taken by Manchus to maintain their own cultural traditions.
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When the Manchus came south of the Great Wall, their homeland of Manchuria
remained closed off to Han individuals, and Manchu women actively avoided foot
binding traditions. These actions helped preserve Manchu traditions, which
remained behind the tangible barrier between two peoples. This barrier,
interpreted by Han standards placed the Jurchens as Yí or barbarian people,
belonging to a group of people that incorrectly categorized them as nomadic
people of the steppe. In viewing the Jurchens as barbaric, ideas of zoomorphism
spread to dehumanize these “others” by the Han Chinese. These narratives
spread and twentieth century author Thomas Steep repurposed the words of Dr.
Giles as an authority on the queue origin. Steep paraphrases Guiles for the
wearing of queues “because they were lovers of horses and wore their hair long
probably in emulation of their horses’ tails.”37
The Jurchen tribes would eventually conquer the Northern Song Dynasty
(960 – 1127) and established their own short-lived Jin Dynasty (1115 – 1234).
When the Jurchens became victorious over the Northern Song in 1126 they
“issued an order requiring all men in the conquered territories to shave their
foreheads, braid their hair down their back, and wear Jurchen-style clothing to
display their status as subordinates of the Jurchens.”38 Due to the Jurchens
inability to enforce this order on the entire population, the order was rescinded
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only to be again declared in 1129 CE, but it met the same unsuccessful end.39
This early practice of queue implementation was not successful and with the
subsequent Mongol conquest of China in the 1270s, the earlier queue edicts
faded into posterity, being nothing more than a brief event in Chinese history
except to those who were “historically conscious,” in the words of historian
Frederic Wakeman.40
Those striving to be “historically conscious” should ask themselves why
this hairstyle was rejected. There are a variety of possible reasons that could
explain the Chinese rejection of the queue ranging from cultural practices,
religious implications, and rejection of body autonomy. The cultural practice that
would arguably be the most significant to Han male hairstyle practice could be
attributed to Confucian teachings. In Confucian philosophy, the body, including
the hair, is an inheritance from one’s parents, and as such, to shave it or cut it
short is a violation of one’s inheritance. Confucian philosophy, however, was not
universally practiced by all individuals within China, one example is with Buddhist
practioners. For religious or philosophical implications, the likely rejection
followed by Buddhist monks had some sects had philosophical teachings
practice a completely shaved head based on the following doctrine: “And it
should be done this way: First the hair and the beard should be shaved off. Then,
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after putting on the yellow cloth, the upper robe should be arranged on one
shoulder and homage should be paid at the bhikkhu’s feet.”41 The differences are
noticeable between the Buddhist requirement and the partially shaved Jurchen
style, but both were considered taboo and a violation of filial piety in the larger
Confucian philosophy.
The last rejection not only can be attributed to loss of self-autonomy, but
also the disabling aspect of hair cutting, sometimes considered by Confucian
followers as the equivalent of castration. The surrender of bodily autonomy within
a largely Confucian society ruptured the perceived stagnant view of male hair
practices. It was Confucian teachings that would disfavor the cutting of hair,
however as this paper will explain later, the Manchus used a Confucian argument
to argue for the wearing of the queue. When the revolutionaries of 1911 used the
queue as the marker of a republican citizen, they underestimated the shifted
Confucian arguments for a queue. It was this underestimated interpretation that
problematized the uniformity argument that the whole nation wished for a
republican government without queues. Therefore, what was the impact of
Confucius and how did the teachings of this individual become a foundational
base for the region?
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Confucius and the Culture of Hair
The failure of these early queue edicts begs the question of why they were
unsuccessful. For a concept such as hairstyle, it would appear to have little
significance to the historically conscious. Instead, what is significant lies in the
words of Confucius (551 – 479 BCE), China’s most influential philosopher, whose
teachings became cultural orthodoxy in China and surrounding regions in the
2500 years after his death. Though the importance of hair in Chinese cultural
history is likely to have its origins long before, its significance in context to the
Jurchen attempted edicts is in The Classic of Filiality or Xiaojing. Here Confucius
informs his student, Zengzi, on what virtues the kings of old used to keep the
world in harmony:
Our body, skin, and hair are all received from our parents; we dare
not injure them. This is the first priority in filial duty. To establish
oneself in the world and practice the Way; to uphold one’s good
name for posterity and give glory to one’s father and mother – this
is the competition of filial duty. Thus filiality begins with service to
parents, continues in service to the ruler, and ends with
establishing oneself in the world and becoming an exemplary
person.42
Confucius’ teachings became ingrained throughout many dynasties,
beginning with its establishment as imperial orthodoxy and was often the main
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basis of the civil service examination system.43 His ideas were debated and
revised for two millennia, mostly by the dominant, majority ethnic Han Chinese
people.44 The prevalent Confucian practices that existed for centuries were
challenged by the Jurchen’s queue. These Jurchens were not considered
Chinese, and therefore not ethnically or culturally Chinese. This cultural
separation was easily therefore exemplified by having the Great Wall be one
barrier to mark those Han Chinese who existed south of the wall, and those of
the steppe to the north. The Jurchens seen as Barbarians or “others,” the queue
increased hostilities between one ethnic group forcing their practices onto
another. These hostilities made it so that the queue would not be adopted
successfully during the Jurchen-ruled Jin Dynasty.
While the Jurchens failed to implement their tonsure on the northern
Chinese population, they also failed in conquering the remainder of Song China,
sometimes informally known as “China proper,” which includes the Han heartland
of China from the eastern coast through central China. The next threat from the
north came in the form of the Mongol conquest of China and the ensuing
establishment of the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (1271 – 1368), which further
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increased hostilities between those on either side of the wall.45 The Mongol Yuan
Dynasty was short-lived, however, their foreignness in both custom and rule was
recognizable. One method of recognizing this “foreignness” was in the Mongol
hair practice that was adopted by some Han Chinese under the Yuan dynasty.
This practice was the “vertebral buns” in which the top of the bun is shaved to
leave a threefold part on the head.46

Figure 5. Kiu, Ian. "Yuan Dynasty in 1294," Wikimedia Commons, November 12,
2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yuan_Dynasty_1294.png
(Accessed April 2, 2022)
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The Yuan Dynasty was established by Kublai Khan after his conquest of
the Southern Song. The importance of conquering the Southern Song
demonstrates how crucial China proper was in having a solid empire of China
and would become the standard for conquest dynasties.
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Figure 6. "Portrait of Emperor Taizu [Genghis Khan]," Wikimedia Commons,
Fourteenth Century.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:YuanEmperorAlbumGenghisPortrait.jpg
(Accessed October 11, 2021)

This cultural practice became common enough that the founder of the
Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644) published a decree in 1392 stipulating:
[f]or an inner court servant who shaves his forehead leaving a
strand [of hair], and children from the family of officials and
commoners who shave their foreheads and leave a strand: they are
to be castrated, and the entire family sent to military exile in a
distant border. The head shaver, no matter elderly or young, shall
receive the same penalty.47

Hok-Lam Chan, “Ming Taizu’s ‘Placards’ on Harsh Regulations and
Punishments Revealed in Gu Qiyuan’s ‘Kenuo Zhuiyu,’” Asia Major 22, no. 1
(2009): 13.
47

39

The threat of castration and exile on the person who shaves the hair in the
northern fashion provides a glimpse into the anxiety of the Han Emperor over the
ideal dynastic body. In addition, it was also during the Ming dynasty that the
Great Wall would take its recognizable form, further strengthening the separation
between a Han China and the steppe barbarian.48
The action taken by the Hongwu Emperor provides a compelling look into
bodily control. Here, an ethnic Han emperor curtailed the body autonomy of his
subjects to mold a Chinese identity to suit his perceived image. This molded
identity would become successfully ingrained and would cause resistance when
the Jurchens, then known as Manchus, would again challenge the hairstyle of
Han Chinese a few centuries later. This is a problematic notion to remember,
particularly from the Ming-Qing transition where the early queue rejectors did so
out of an expression of their heritage and culturalism. The Hongwu emperor’s
placards alone challenge the uniformity of hair-wearing practices, showing that
often the hair that was worn came from whichever style central imperial power
favored. The Jurchen’s of the Jin could not enforce their hairstyle and therefore it
reverted to the unshaven forelock and unbraided hair. The Mongol led Yuan saw
an adoption by some of the Mongol style that antagonized the Ming emperor to
have a Ming style.
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Figure 7. Jjarivera."Map of Asia and Western Pacific during the Ming Dynasty
(China)," Wikimedia Commons, September 24, 2008.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ming_China_and_Asia.jpg (Accessed
April 1, 2022)

From the Ming Rose the Jurchens
Though the queue implementation of the twelfth century was a failed
Jurchen policy, it would become successful after a restructuring of Jurchen
identity centuries later during the late Ming period. This restructuring can be
credited to the Jurchen chief, Nurhaci (1559 – 1629 CE) who would unite the
tribes and establish the Later Jin Dynasty (1616 – 1636 CE) taking for himself the
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Mongol title of Khan.49 This dynastic name was an homage to the brief twelfthcentury Jin dynasty primarily due to growing grievances that the Jurchens had
with their Han rulers, the Ming. Nurhaci is crucial to the enshrinement of the
Jurchen identity in its final stages, going so far as to centralize and consolidate
an Eight Banner System for the Jurchen society and advocating for the creation
of a new written script for the people based on the Mongol script.50
It should be stressed that there is a clear proximity between the Jurchens and the
Mongols even before this time. Nurhaci viewed the Mongols as being closer,
culturally, than their Chinese neighbors, and this is evident not only in the
adoption of their script, but also in taking the ruling title of the Mongols, Khan,
rather than the Chinese title of emperor. Another link between the two is in a
style of hair that involves shaving of the head. Though not identical, their haircuts
do in fact differ from the Han style of unshaven hair. Rather than three parts of
hair in the Mongol fashion, the Jurchen singular part of hair still differed than
traditional Ming hair styles. This would be an important comparison in the coming
decades, for there would be a substantial policy implementation surrounding the
queue.
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Nurhaci bridged the cultural spheres between Jurchen and Mongol but
that would not be the end of reestablishing a new identity for the Jurchens. It
would be Nurhaci’s son, Hong Taiji (1592 – 1643) who would rename the
Jurchen people as Manchu and rename the dynasty as the Great Qing in 1636,
which would last until 1912 when the boy Emperor Puyi would abdicate his
throne.

From Ming to Qing and Beyond
The late Ming followed a period of other dynasties where unrest and
disastrous socio-political developments would weaken the control of the ruling
dynasty. The weakened Han-led Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644 CE) could not stop
the rebels of Li Zicheng (1606 – 1645 CE) from conquering and pillaging Beijing
in 1644. With Beijing conquered, Li established the brief “Shun” interregnum,
leading the Ming Zhongzhen Emperor (1611 – 1644) to commit suicide by
hanging. Ming General Wu Sangui (1612 – 1678) required assistance to defeat
the rampaging Shun rebels and so he allowed the Manchus to pass through the
Great Wall, the long-standing physical and cultural barrier dividing Han Chinese
from northern “barbarians.”
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Figure 8. Halun, Jakub. "The Great Wall of China near Jinshaling," Wikimedia
Commons, May 29, 2009.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:20090529_Great_Wall_8185.jpg
(Accessed April 7, 2022)

With the Manchus’ help, the Shun rebels were quickly defeated, and the
Manchus took the throne in Beijing, surprising Wu that this would not be a Ming
restoration but rather the beginning of a new dynasty altogether.51 With the
Manchus ruling Tianxia or “All-Under-Heaven,” China officially entered its final
era of imperial rule, displacing ethnic Han from dominant political control until the
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early twentieth century. It was in response to the displacement of ethnic Hans
from rule that the phenomenon of Ming loyalism emerged.
In The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in
Seventeenth-century China, Frederic Wakeman Jr. used material that was newly
available to Western scholars to examine the monumental task that the Qing had
in establishing minority rule over a majority Han population. By extension this rule
would ultimately include additional minorities such as Mongol, Uighur, and
Tibetan populations under the control of the Qing. Wakeman explains that the
“great enterprise” “describes a Confucian dynasty’s effort to gain and hold the
Mandate of Heaven by ruling the ‘under-Heaven’ (tianxia) of China.”52 His core
argument is, “[t]he fall of the Ming house and the rise of the Qing regime in 1644
was the most dramatic dynastic succession in all of Chinese history.”53 By doing
so, the Manchus were positioned before their conquest of Beijing to start the
great enterprise, relying on Han Chinese collaborators at different stages in their
conquest.54
Early Chinese pacification efforts by the Jurchens can be observed
through Nuraci’s Liandong’s campaign, and Wakeman reproduces his message
to the Ming military leader Li Yongfang on their early surrender: “If you submit
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without fighting, I will not change your great doro (guiding principles) at all. I will
let you live just as you did before.”55 This promise was to not mandate the
adoption of the Jurchen queue hairstyle if they surrendered. Scholars must
consider this policy alongside the previous twelfth-century failed implementation
of the queue by the Jin. On the surface this hints that any further attempt at
mandating a Jurchen tonsure was abandoned at this time. However, Nuraci
would shift his stance in the coming years revealing that the queue issue was not
only alive and well within the minds of the Jurchen elites, but for some, it was the
centerpiece in a Jurchen-led polity. The queue issue in the Later Jin and Qing
conquest and grab for power the mandating of conquered Han Chinese men to
adopt the queue is a representation of the issue. Wakeman provides examples of
the early forced tonsure practice, noting the Ming commander Zhang Chun’s
capture in 1631 and his refusal to adopt the queue, thereupon being exiled to a
Lamaist temple until he capitulated.56
Pacification under Nurhaci’s son, Hong Taiji (1592 – 1643) and by
extension Prince Dorgon (1612 – 1650) is reexamined by Wakeman who notes
the practice of “save the people” by not plundering, burning, or even killing.57
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It was the brutality of the Shun rebels in their conquest of Beijing that
helped prompt Ming General Wu Sangui to side with the Manchus in the first
place. the Manchus had at this time already conquered the Ming tributary state of
present-day Korea in 1637 and made their intentions of hostility towards the Ming
known. General Wu did recognize the peaceful streak in some of the Manchu
46

Instead, the only impact that would come to those that submitted would be to the
hair of the males in their adoption of the queue. When the Manchus took Beijing
in 1644 and “avenged the Ming” by expelling the Shun rebels, they did not
implement a Ming restoration. What instead occurred was the imperial ritual of
the child Emperor Shunzhi (1638 - 1661) performing his rites at the Altar of
Heaven, ultimately beginning the official Qing dynastic succession over the Ming.
With this succession came the long-awaited implementation of Manchu custom,
the Queue Edict of 1645.
Now that our dynasty has established its authority in Peking, the
soldiers and common people who endured recent calamities are all
our children. We will save them from disasters and give them
security. Send messengers to cities and forts of all regions
requesting their surrender. If, on the day this message arrives, their
inhabitants shave their heads and submit, all local officials shall be
promoted one rank. Soldiers and common… audience. Those who
claim to submit but do not shave their heads are hesitant and
watchful. They should be given a deadline for compliance based on
their distance from the capital… if they do not meet the deadline, it
is clear that they are resisting and definitely should be punished;
troops are to be sent to suppress them. Princes with the surname
Zhu who conform to this order shall not be deprived of their titles
and will continue to enjoy imperial grace.58

conquest and the destruction that the Shun rebels had inflicted was a tipping
point. General Wu decided to side with the enemy he knew, rather than side with
the sacrilegious Shun. It is also worth noting that the Manchus had established a
government bureaucracy inspired by the Ming, and their political and military
organization matched their ambition.
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This edict provided a security and safety to those who surrendered to the
Qing, and subsequently shaved their forelock in the Manchu style. By adopting
this hairstyle, the Manchu rulers could easily tell who had submitted to their rule
and who had not. This order itself, like the policy implemented by the Jurchens in
1126 CE, was not entirely successful. The implementation of the policy was
uneven, and this led to the second queue edict later that same year.
In the past the system of dressing the hair in a queue was not
uniformly enforced. People were allowed to do as they pleased
because we wanted to wait until the whole country was pacified
before putting into force this system. Now within and without, we
are one family. The emperor is like the father and the people are
like his sons. The father and sons are of the same body; how can
they be different from one another? If they are not as one then it will
be as if they had two hearts and would they then not be like the
people of different countries? We do not need to mention this
because we believe all subjects under Heaven must be aware of it
themselves. All residents of the capital and its vicinity will fulfill the
order to shave their heads within ten days of this proclamation. For
Zhili and other provinces compliance must take place within ten
days of receipt of our order from the Board of Rites. Those who
follow this order belong to our country; those who hesitate will be
considered treasonous bandits and will be heavily penalized.
Anyone who attempts to evade this order to protect his hair or who
uses cunning language to argue against it will not be lightly dealt
with. All officials in regions that we have already pacified who
insultingly advance a memorial related to this matter arguing for the
continuation of the Ming system and not following the system of our
dynasty will be executed without the possibility of pardon. As for
other apparel, unhurried change is permitted, but it cannot differ
from the system of our dynasty. The aforementioned Board will
immediately dispatch this message to the capital and its vicinity to
the provincial, prefectural, sub-prefectural, and country yamen and
garrisons of Zhili and other provinces, Civil and military yamen

48

officials, clerks, scholars, students, and all members of military and
civilian household shall carry this out without exception.59

The second edict reflects a variety of problems that the Manchus faced.
The first is the Qing recognizing that they had not successfully enforced their own
queue policy. This clearly illustrates the flexibility and pragmatism of the Qing
rulers, recognizing that the Confucian population now under their rule would have
posed a greater threat if a tonsure policy had been implemented too soon.
Instead, the Qing authorities used the Confucian concept of filial piety to reinforce
the adoption of the queue (even though resistance to it was also driven by
Confucian filial piety in the preservation of the inherited body). This would be
different from the argument of the Ming Hongwu Emperor who only mandated a
style without a Confucian explanation. As the edict stated, the Qing emperor
himself wore a queue, and he was the father of the empire, and his dutiful sons
must be like him. To refuse would brand individuals as traitors to the Qing and
they would be put to death. Further, all who opposed or argued against the policy
would be executed as well, meeting the same end as the ones who did not wear
this style. In addition, and likely the most important aspect of the policy is shown
through the advocation of the Ming system. Any subject under the Qing who
advocated or argued in a style of Ming-loyalism would be summarily executed,
and all subjects would have ten days from receiving the edict to adopt the queue.
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With this edict, the stakes of loyalty to the dynasty was set and Han individuals
would need to choose between shaving their hair or losing their heads.
The Qing, unlike the Ming, used an argument of filial piety to enforce a
specific hairstyle within the Han population. On the surface, the queue policy
appears to be merely a cultural practice that became mandated as the marker of
the subjugation of a population. In reality it would be seen as a cultural
molestation with far deeper meaning, one rooted in a kind of cultural disabling
that would lead to disempowerment and torment in overseas communities.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE BODY AND CHANGE

The Queue and “Successful” Body Modification
The reason lurking beneath the resistance to the queue edict, both in the
twelfth century and the seventeenth was due to the linking of hair cutting with
castration. In viewing castration as a practice, one could perceive the action as
an attack on an individual’s physical autonomy. This physical and cultural threat,
like bodily castration, was the cause behind the resistance to adopting the
Manchu queue by Han Chinese.60 The queue was deemed a disabling agent,
forced onto the bodies of subjects who had been largely unmolested during Ming
dynastic rule. The Ming’s Hongwu Emperor as stated did in fact implement a
hairstyle policy immediately after the defeat of the Yuan dynasty.
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Figure 9. "Seated Portrait of Ming Emperor Taizu [Hongwu]," Wikimedia
Commons, Fifteenth Century.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:A_Seated_Portrait_of_Ming_Emperor_T
aizu.jpg (Accessed April 6, 2022)

As explained by disability studies and feminist theorist, Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson, the social disability model posits that “disability is a
representation, a cultural interpretation of physical transformation or
configuration, and a comparison of bodies that structures social relations and
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institutions.”61 This view posits that impairments, like a disability, comes from the
society surrounding the individual. Through this model, the everyday relevance of
a “disability” is what society says it is, not because it actually is. The social model
of disability moved the discussion to show impairment disabled an individual due
to its cultural importance, and everyday relevance or lack of accommodation.
When analyzed as a social construction imposed by interpretation, it is revealed
how the queue edict was the largest catalyst for intensifying and even creating
Ming loyalism where a Joseon (Korean) official named Yu On-sul viewed “Han
Chinese men did not feel comfortable in their new clothing and even felt
ashamed about dressing like barbaric people.”62
The early rejection of Manchu rule by few literati was based on a
difference of culturalism between the Han-led Ming Dynasty and a Manchu-led
Qing Dynasty. By culturalism, this paper utilizes the static view of rites and
practices shared within a particular group or society, specifically Han individuals.
In this view the relatively peaceful transition and quick reimplementation of
government institutions did not matter to most elites. These elites understood
that the alternative to Qing reimplementation of government was chaos of
institutions that would be tumultuous at best to quell and pacify. This allowed for
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a quick acceptance of the transferring of the heavenly mandate from the failing
Han Ming to the now Manchu-led Qing. The relatively few objectors of Qing rule
were rooted in ethnic culturalism that remained the center for their rejection, and
that would spread and intensify with the implementation of the queue edict of
Prince Dorgon in 1645. This edict placed once-submissive areas of control into
open rebellion, all on the pretext of hair, traceable as a social construction
imposed by political policies in the form of violent Ming loyalism.

Seventeenth-Century Ming Loyalism
The queue edict united different social classes in a way that the Qing
could only envy. Instead, the united class movement was in opposition to the
Qing rulers, primarily because they viewed hair shaving as a betrayal of “Han
masculinity.”63 The ideal view of Han masculinity was one that embodied Ming
cultural traditions, conditioned with filial piety to become culturally normal for
society around them. This betrayal of masculinity is one the Chinese in Western
diasporic communities would encounter centuries later where the queue was
mocked as feminine. In the years after the successful conquest of the Ming
territories in the North, violence would break out anew in response to the edict.
One former Ming court official, Xu Chongxi wrote an account of the siege of
Jiangyin by the Qing. He writes that the day the edict reached the city, scholar Xu
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Yongde hung a portrait of the Ming founder in the Minglun Lecture Hall and a
crowd subsequently chanted, “Cut off our heads, we refuse to shave our hair.”64
The position taken by those within the lecture hall to lose one’s head over cutting
their hair likely shows how ingrained filial piety was to the Confucian Ming.
Those who did not openly rebel against the Qing, knowing that the Manchu
military would come to quell this disloyalty formed early anti-Manchu
underground secret societies in the name of Ming-loyalism.65 Some early sects
like the Hung Society, issued decrees and oaths of similar sentiment such as the
following:
[W]e, sharing fortune and misfortune, are dedicated to the
restoration of the Ming dynasty which belonged to Heaven and
earth and all existence, to the destruction of the barbarian bandits,
and to waiting for the true mandate of Heaven.”66
Equating the Manchus with barbarians was not a new concept that
emerged during the Qing conquest. What is revealed by the hostile language of
early Ming loyalist and secret societies is that the rhetoric of Han Chinese
chauvinists and Ming loyalists in the first century of Qing rule would in effect,
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One such secret society that emerged in the late Qing would be the
Tongmenghui of Sun Yat-sen in 1905, known as the Chinese Revolutionary
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become blurred together in meaning.67 The restoration of the Ming was equated
to Han chauvinism, and the bridge connecting these two ideas of resistance to
the Qing was the queue hairstyle. Qing authorities quelled the violent resistance
to the 1645 queue edict over time, mostly through military force through Han
collaborators and the Eight Banner System. Some of the last areas to become
pacified into Qing rule under the Kangxi Emperor (1654 – 1722) would be regions
in outer Mongolia and Taiwan. In addition, Kangxi’s reign saw the period of the
Three Feudatories (1673 -1681), which was an open rebellion by former Ming
officials who served the Qing, only to rebel against them in the name of Ming
loyalism.
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Han Chauvinism is a termed coined by Chairman Mao Zedong in a
1953 talk to the Communist Central Committee. This term was a connotation of
ethnic supremacy of the Han population. Individuals of this view believed the Han
were superior to all other ethnic groups, such as Manchu, Hakka, or Li. This was
different than Ming Loyalism which was specific to longing for a return of the
Ming dynasty. In brief, Han chauvinism was the embodiment of ethnic racism,
going further than a sense of ethnic cultural pride whose proponents would be
anti-Manchu minded individuals.
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Figure 10 "Portrait of the Kangxi Emperor," Wikimedia Commons, Late Kangxi
Period.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Portrait_of_the_Kangxi_Emperor_in_Co
urt_Dress.jpg (Accessed April 7, 2022)

Perhaps the most prominent individual of note of this rebellion was Wu
Sangui, the former Ming general who allowed the Manchus to pass the Great
Wall and enter Beijing. Wu had adopted the queue early in his support of the
Manchus and was quick to remove it when he declared his rebellion against the
Qing. However, his defeat and others of his movement changed the way antiManchu sentiments were expressed. The ensuing prosperity of the Kangxi
Emperor’s rule, including his successful conquest of the remaining Ming loyalist
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territory, would further push these anti-Manchu sentiments underground to
survive Manchu rule.
For the Manchu conquest, the long period of consolidation of what were
once Ming loyalist causes can be looked at with the examination of the Kangxi
Emperor in 1679. Here Wakeman notes the compilation of an official Ming history
to be written by those who passed the civil service examination, many of whom
were not adults when the Manchus originally conquered Beijing in 1644.68
Culminating with Kangxi’s suppression of the Three Feudatories in which “Kangxi
and his minister knew that the Qing’s mandate was no wei ding – no ‘bogus
settlement’ but really the beginning another glorious cycle in Chinese imperial
history.”69 Due to Kangxi’s ability to successfully control the largest Chinese area
under his rule, this validates the Qing as the most dramatic dynastic succession
in all of Chinese history.
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It is this glorious and dramatic dynastic succession that the movement that
the New Qing Historians were challenged. The most vocal view came from
University of Chicago’s Ping-Ti Ho, who debated Evelyn Rawski’s perspective on
Sinicization. Ho directly challenges Rawski’s turn away from Sinicization, stating
that “Rawski’s argument posits a false dichotomy between being Manchu and
becoming Chinese.”70 A major opinion of proponents of Sinicization like Ho was
that the “available Manchu-language sources are not quite the nature and quality
that Rawski would have us believe.”71 These competing views fueled further
scholarship into the Qing, ultimately leaning towards the Manchu documents to
speak for themselves. What emerged from these Manchu documents was a
dissection on how the Manchus viewed themselves and their role in a multiethnic empire. This view challenges the historical approach of viewing the Qing in
the same manner as the previous dynasties as becoming absorbed into the
Chinese ethos. In doing so, this Manchu-focused analysis would become
attributed as the New Qing Historiography School in which the queue is ideally
placed.
This paper’s use of the New Qing analytical method of deconstructing the
Manchu dynasty is crucial to understanding the complexity of identity. The root of
this identity is directly owed to the multi-ethnic empire that the Qing rulers
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recognized as no wei ding, demonstrating that under their rule the meaning of
who was Chinese did not belong to one ethnic cultural group but of the many that
existed within the empire. This complex identity withing the multi-ethnic empire
becomes more more transparent into the minds not only of the educated elite
class in China, but also within the communal self-image of what a Chinese
identity was and should be when surrounding the queue. Scholars are
continuously challenged to revisit preconceived understandings of the Qing era,
and from this challenge build a new understanding of what would emerge as a
modern Chinese identity. Yuanchong Wang from the University of Delaware is
one such scholar who has been able to benefit from the restructuring of identity
of the Qing by using the Korean Joseon Dynasty (1392 – 1897). Wang makes an
important note that “the Qing could define itself as China from within, while it
could not identify itself as the Heavenly Dynasty without support from outside the
Qing; the new regime would first have to build up a new, Qing-centric, and
multinational Zongfan system”72 This is in direct correlation to the Qing placing
itself at the center of the world and taking the title of Tianxia into the reign of the
Kangxi emperor and Qianlong emperors.73 In doing so, the Qing classified “the
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The relationship between the zongfan and tributary system are closely
related but different in practice. The tributary system would focus on the authority
of a single head of rites and rituals, the Chinese emperor. In comparison, the
zongfan system would see the Chinese state control foreign policy of the tributary
state while still allowed to have internal autonomy. For a closer analysis of the
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Manchus, Han Chinese, and Mongolians, [as] ‘people of China.’”74 This was a
vision in which these people would follow the Manchu emperor in custom, and in
hair. In addition, by the Qing using Joseon as the measuring tool for the
surrounding and internal areas as they conquered Ming China, the hair still
played a role. The author notes that in the role of Taiwan with Ming-Loyalist
Zheng Jing (1642 – 1681), Zheng “insisted on following the Choson [Joseon]
model by ‘proclaiming subordination and paying tribute but refraining from cutting
his hair in the Qing style.”75 Joseon Korea and also Taiwanese territorial areas as
entrance into the Qing system reveal that hair practices still played a role in
negotiations of the Qing empire even during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor.
The culmination of these negotiations saw Joseon Korea and Taiwan enter a
system where Qing China was in the center, and the neo-Confucian practice
surrounding hair became a motivating factor behind the autonomy of the regions.
This is to note that the Joseon as a tributary did not wear the queue. Taiwan on
the other hand had a Ming-loyalist leader that wished to enter this same system,
only to be folded into the Qing by force during the Kangxi Emperors reign. The
threat of queue wearing was a ritual practice that, even decades after the Qing
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conquest of Beijing, would still influence the views of Chinese individuals on
proper body autonomy. Upon closer examination of Zheng in Taiwan, he was
born in 1642 merely two years before the fall of the Ming from their capital city of
Beijing. Therefore, his customary practices did not come from centralized Ming
control but influenced from remnants of the Ming system by Ming-Loyalist.
Though the whole of the Qing empire would largely come under control of the
Manchus under the Kangxi emperor, the following period would not be without
issues surrounding the queue.

The Socially Ingrained Queue and the Sorcery Scare
Philip A. Kuhn’s Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 details
one of the most important historical events regarding the queue during Qing rule
in the eighteenth century. Set during the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1711 –
1799), Kuhn situates the period as during the “Prosperous Age” of the High Qing.
However, Kuhn notes that the prosperity in the Qing was not uniform, where
depending on the economic situation in regions, migratory groups of people
seeking subsistence wages would travel between provinces. For the common
folk, “commercial growth may have meant, not the prospect of riches or security,
but a scant margin of survival in a competitive and crowded society.”76 This was
in large part due to the necessity of every able-bodied person to provide
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economic support as the Qing population grew exponentially. Highly prosperous
areas would be directly linked to land cultivation, and less prosperous areas saw
population groups migrate out in search of work or living prospects.
It was these among these migrating people that the sorcery scare
emerged, since locals feared and were suspicious of travelers and outsiders.
This soul stealing was the superstition of these wandering individuals who could
trap the souls of people and in doing so “[t]hose whose soul-force was thus
stolen would fall ill and die.”77 Kuhn makes the important observation that the
people accused would become “victims of lynch mobs and of torture chambers”
and often belonged to the vulnerable class of “wandering monks and beggars.”78
The origin of the increased number of wandering peoples, either as monks or
beggars was due to population growth that displaced people from unproductive
agricultural areas.79 Queue clipping was the most widely reported action and by
far the most popular said to have been practiced by the soul stealers.
It should be stated that monks easily became targets on whom to lay
blame for the queue-clipping sorcery scare. One reason behind this is that unlike
the Han population who wore queues, the monks themselves were exempt from
wearing a queue. Any individuals of the Han ethnic group that resented wearing
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a queue could easily place their hostile sentiments on a group of people who
were not wearing queues. As more wanderers entered new areas, the
widespread rumor of queue clipping was attributed to monks and other
wandering persons of interest. Wanders had at this time already been subject to
cautionary looks from residents and suspicious of queue clipping was the newest
accusation. These accusations likely grew from a previous period that is best
described by Huiying Chen from the University of Chicago. Chen clarifies that
this caution was owed to the earlier decades where a case of laoguazei or “old
melon thief” which was to mean “a kind of robber-murderer that preyed on
travelers and plagued the Central Plain of China.”80 The relationship between
laoguazei and the Qing officials who hunted them spread in popular culture,
becoming heard in areas outside of the Central Plains. Chen writes that “the
emergence of laoguazei spoke to China’s prosperous economy, which was
fueled by and in turn drove more people onto the road, traveling to make a
living.”81
With previous tales of the laoguazei, it is no surprise the scare spreading
from town to town. Mob violence would intensify as a result and only become
pacified with the arrival of a Qing official as an arbiter of justice to those who
believed that had had their queues clipped.

Huiying Chen, “Dangers on the Road: Travelers, Laoguazei, and the
State in Eighteenth-Century North China,” Project Muse, Late Imperial China, 40,
no. 1 (2019): 88.
80

81

Chen, 123.
64

Understandably, this caused anxieties to flare for the local population
since it would be a crime punishable by death for a person to be without a queue
without permission from the Qing authorities. Therefore, the mob violence that
emerged against the wanderers intensified as panic spread. Word of the violence
spread far enough to reach the Qianlong emperor himself, who ordered a strict
investigation into these soul stealing incidents. The emperor’s goal was to root
out the mastermind soul-stealer rumors, said to have been behind the mass of
soulstealing hysteria. Ultimately the investigation would become unfounded due
to the disconnect between provincial leaders, Qing investigators, and the
superstitious claims of the local population.82 The disconnect between the
governmental agents and the local population could not be further illustrated
when it came to the soul stealing event. The unfounded accusations stemmed
from officials coming to local areas, only to find that often the confessions of
those labeled as “soulstealers” came from torture after the initial mob violence,
and therefore, unreliable confessions. These monks, nuns, and other wandering
people who were set upon by the local population were coerced to give their
“confessions.” The investigators realized that there would be no stock to be
placed in many of the soul stealing cases, causing the search for a mastermind
soulstealer to be propelled yet again.
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The specter of queue clipping at this time was upsetting and fear inducing
given the hostility that the public forced onto many innocent souls.83 Mob violence
that occurred towards unfamiliar beggars, nuns, and monks as those responsible
for soul stealing via queue cutting presented two important queries. The first is of
the relation between the local superstitions that seemed to differ in rationale from
Qing authorities, given the investigative nature under torture revealed by the
officials. The local traditions seemed to vary relative to those of the central
government on superstitions, and therefore showing a disconnect in perspectives
on localism when it came to community values regarding the queue.84 The
second query is in the transformative nature of the queue a century past the
original edict of 1645. Rather than the widespread rejection of the hair cutting
edict, what instead is illustrated by the sorcery scare of 1768 is that queue cutting
had evolved to be an unforgivable act, which was unacceptable both locally and
centrally in Chinese society. Therefore, this demonstrates that the queue, now a
century into Manchu rule, had become a fully adopted “invented tradition” and a
Chinese cultural practice inseparable from Chinese identity by the end of the
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eighteenth century. This identity would become further challenged during the
nineteenth century by the disastrous conflict of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.

The Taiping Long Hairs
As historically conscious individuals of the late Qing period, perhaps no
event is as recognizable as the Taiping Kingdom of Heavenly Peace (1850 1864) established by Hong Xiuquan (1814 – 1864). An ethnic Hakka in the
southern region of China, Hong would ultimately lead the costliest human
rebellion in history.

Figure 11. "Portrait of Hong Xiuquan," Wikimedia Commons, est. 1850 - 1864.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hong_Xiuquan.jpg (Accessed April 7,
2022)

At its core, the Taiping rebellion (1850 -1864) was a Christian sect that
viewed Hong as the younger brother of Jesus Christ, and therefore a legitimate
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intermediary between heaven and earth.85 This legitimacy was in direct
opposition to the beliefs and practices of not only the largely Confucian society,
but also that of the ruling Manchus, not to mention the foreign Christians now
moving freely throughout China as missionaries since the Opium War resolution
of 1842 allowed them this privilege. While significant to the larger historiography
of China in the late imperial period, what makes the Taiping movement especially
relevant to the conversation of the queue lies in their own hairstyle practices. The
Taiping rebels would become known as the Taiping Long Hairs, which was a
direct reference to the unshaven crowns or forelocks of the rebels. In addition,
the beliefs of the Taiping’s further challenged the allegiance of neutral people,
effectively forcing them to choose between their Manchu rulers, or siding with the
Taiping rebels.
What effectively became another point of contention to the identity of the
Chinese people was their hair. The queue edict had already been sent out from
Beijing by nearly two centuries at the start of the Taiping movement. However,
the rebellion was not originally a Manchu hunting group. Before the 1850s, Hong
was effectively establishing the monotheistic practices he himself viewed as
central to the faith, as well as championing some but not all Confucian values.
This is understandable given that he himself was a trained Confucian scholar, he
merely failed to pass the extremely rigorous civil service examinations. The
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evolution of the Taping movement to become anti-Manchu lies in the culmination
of a series of events. Hong’s proselytizing gave wandering groups like the ethnic
Hakka’s a “transcendent destiny to lead all Han peoples against the demonic
Manchu dynasty.”86 When Hong briefly returned home he received news of the
death of his father, and therefore was required to enter a mourning period, as
customary at this time.
This period required certain actions, chief among them was to not trim or
cut one’s hair for three years.87 This included the hair on the top of one’s head,
as well as facial hair of an individual for three years. While the Manchu regime
makes this significant is though the Manchu regime implemented the rule of the
queue, this mourning practice was as strictly enforced. When one entered a
mourning period, regardless of if they were Han, Hakka, or even Manchu, they
were required to allow their hair to grow.88 This ultimately was a respected
practice by the Manchus that allowed temporary leniency of the strict queue
practice. In addition, those that did not practice the mourning custom of growing
one’s hair were punished just as those who refused to wear the queue during the
remaining period of their lives.89

Kuhn, “Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross-Cultural Dimensions of a
Chinese Rebellion,” 366.
86

Jonathan Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom
of Hong Xiuquan (United States: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 268.
87

88

Spence, 269.

89

Spence, 109.
69

Hong thus grew his hair out during the inter-period of 1849 and 1850 as
he mourned his father. However, when he left to continue his journey, he did not
revert back to the mandated queue hairstyle. This social practice that was
enforced politically by the Manchus likely presented an opportunity for Hong to
further his cause, one easily identifiable through a hairstyle. The queue issue
resurfaced the predicament of 1645 where originally those who did not wear one
were seen as Ming-loyalists or anti-Qing rebels and thus were summarily
executed. For Hong and his “God-worshippers,” the wearing of the queue was a
mark of apostasy. This was because in 1850, Hong specified whom he viewed to
be the “Demon devils” of which he had preached for over a decade. It was at this
time that the demons came to be identified as the Manchus, primarily in his
reference to them as “demon officials.”90 Following the eventual declaration of the
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 1851 by Hong, this community would become
known colloquially as the Taiping Long Hairs, emulating the practice of their
religious and political leader. The rebels were physically marked by their refusal
to wear the Manchu tonsure was a change from sentiments against the norm of
anti-Manchu rule. This difference in thought was paramount to the changing
meaning of the queue, especially when compared with the Taiping movement.
The Taiping refusal to wear a queue was not to symbolize loyalty to the Ming, but
rather was a symbol of imitation of their ruling figure who denounced Manchu
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demon practices. The most prominent demon practice of interpretation was in the
queue, where Taiping rebels were figures who openly displayed their “direct
sedition” to the Manchus by refusing to wear the mandated queue.91
By openly wearing their hair in violation of Manchu law, the Taiping gained
support of some secret societies who were part of the “indirect sedition”
movements. These secret societies, such as the Heaven-And-Earth Society, felt
that supporting Hong meant furthering Ming loyalist goals.92 The Ming loyalist
groups that flocked to Hong, but did not necessarily believe in the Taiping
doctrine, had the effect of intensifying anti-Qing sentiments.
Since hair became the marker of supporting the Qing or supporting the
Taiping during the mid-nineteenth century, incentives could be placed by one
party or the other to target the opposing faction. In the case of the Qing, one
Hubei governor offered “cash rewards for every Taiping solider they capture:
twenty ounces of silver for every male Taiping head with hair so long one can tell
it belongs to a veteran soldier, and ten ounces for each Taiping head with the
shorter hair of recent recruits to rebel ranks.”93 This signified that hair was the
undeniable factor in determining if one was in support of the Qing or a supporter
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of the Taiping, and the length of the hair signified how long one was a supporter
of the rebels.
For those that did not support the Taiping rebels, hair was a marker to
signal the coming slaughter by the Long Hairs. One case outside of of Shanghai
in 1853 showed the effects of this marker when a panic ensued after word of four
long-haired rebels were seen in a town, causing a stampede that left twentyseven trampled.94 In addition to growing the hair out, some of the rebels alse
altered the way they wore their hair, even electing to stray from the Ming style as
well, favoring instead to wear the hair unbraided and as close to “natural” as
possible.95 As for others, as observed by a Mr. E. Reynolds, a European diplomat
living in Nanking, on January 21, 1857 that “[a]lthough the head is never shaved
in front, they do not dispense with the tail, still keeping it plaited, sometimes with
red and yellow silk.”96 The variety of hairstyles among the Long Hairs shows that
outside of the forelock being grown, there was not a singular fashion to keep the
remaining hair in a specific style.
The Taiping movement neared its end, with the estimated deaths of over
twenty million people including the heavenly King Hong himself. The son of Hong
Xiuquan, Tiangui Fu, fled from Qing forces at only fifteen years old after the fall of
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Nanking to the Qing in 1964. The fall of his father’s heavenly capital in present
day Nanjing compelled Tiangui Fu not to fight to the bitter end though many
rebels did. Instead, “Tiangui Fu shaves off his long Taiping tresses” before
eventually being captured in late 1864 and later executed.97 By removing the
Taiping hairstyle, Tiangui returned to the queue hairstyle as an unsuccessful
attempt at salvation before being executed by Qing officials.

The Rising Tide of Revolutionary Anti-Manchuism
China’s constant violation of sovereignty from Western and Japanese
imperialist incursions fueled widespread discontent amongst Han revolutionaries
with the failure of the Qing Manchu rulers. These same Han revolutionaries
repurposed the existing ideas of anti-Manchu thought and channeled it towards
the creation of a modern nation-state of China. The revolutionaries took an
existing concept of Ming-loyalism and combined it with rising sentiments of
nationalism to topple the Manchus and install the Han ethnic group into power.
The revolutionaries would not be unchallenged in their attempts to fan the flames
of anti-Manchu rhetoric, in fact, there were serious attempts from Qing loyalist to
keep the Manchus in power through reforms. It was these reform movements
that delayed the overthrow of the Manchus, by rapidly modernizing institutions in
China such as education, the military, and administrative bureaucracy to
cauterize imperialist incursions.
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To combat these reform movements, the revolutionaries recognized their
need of a different form of anti-Manchuism to unite the general population to their
side. The ideology behind the newer late nineteenth and early twentieth century
anti-Manchuism was the reimagining of the Qing conquest of the seventeenth
century. These revolutionaries endeavored to turn the conquest into a personal
memory for the general population and educated elites. Revolutionaries used
their indirect experience of reliving the pain of the seventeenth century into the
twentieth century into the masses, owed to the marginalized experiences they
faced in Japan, Mexico, and the United States. The revolutionaries recycled the
blame of suffering to the Manchus and ignored the actual hand of the Qing
conquest, Han collaborators. This conquest was deemed as “trauma” which its
transference of the Yangzhou and Jiading atrocities were revived.98
One important aspect to remember of the Qing conquest is that most of
the successes of the military conquest were due to extensive Han collaboration.
The Manchu population was a mere fraction of the total population of the Qing
Empire. Not only did the Manchus successfully implement minority rule, but most
of the Manchu population was also not part of the military wing. Only a fraction of
the already small Manchu population served in the military wing of the Eight
Banner System. Han forces swelled the ranks of the Banner system by their
sheer numbers; however, they would always be placed in a subservient role of
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the hierarchical system within the Eight Banner System itself. Therefore, the
revolutionaries engaged in a style of historical amnesia, promoting the idea that
the Qing conquest was carried out by only non-Chinese.
The narrative of Manchu conquest was warped to suit the wishes of ethnic
Han revolutionaries, so the Manchus were therefore completely othered. This
narrative became the drum of revolution by joining old and new wounds of
suffering together. The new wounds came from the racialized experiences that
the queue placed onto Chinese individuals in the diasporic community to shape
emerging nationalistic ideas. The transnational experiences from revolutionaries
who went overseas while in Japan and the West used their shared
marginalization to facilitate ideas to enter the ether of anti-Manchuism on the
mainland. Xiaowei Zheng, a Historian of Modern China from the University of
California, Santa Barbara notes that many Western ideas “ha[d] three modes of
entry into China; missionary publications, translated books published in
Shanghai, and writings of Chinese who had been to the West.”99
Zheng’s first two modes of Western entry into China are realized but not
limited to the context of the Taiping Rebellion. It is known that the introduction of
Western Christianity played a direct role in the founding of the Taiping Kingdom
of Heavenly Peace. Although clearly not a carbon copy of their Western
counterparts, Taiping Christianity was still rooted in some Abrahamic traditions
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surrounding God and Jesus Christ. Furthermore, Zheng’s last point on writings of
Chinese who had been to the West reveals the key in unraveling the rising sense
of Chinese nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. British
historian of the Middle East, Elie Kedourie defines nationalism as:
a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the
unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own,
for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right
organization of a society of states.100

Through colonial experience, individuals would become educated in colonial
institutions but still be unable to successfully be accepted by the colonizing
power. This would be especially true for revolutionaries who would reside in
places like Hong Kong or Guangzhou (Canton), amongst a few of the treaty ports
opened by the Opium Wars. In this regard, the subjugation of the Qing empire
and concessions to the Imperialist powers during the first and second Opium
Wars opened the door to foreign influence from abroad.
This paper continually points to the Taiping Long Hairs in this regard of
foreign influence due to the centerfold nature the queue played in this conflict. In
addition, it was the Taiping rebellion that intensified the migration of individuals to
leave mainland China for overseas communities in which this paper will go into
further detail below. Continuing, Kedourie notes discrimination arising in Africa
and Asia when the European population settled into native areas. The rising
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animosity occurred by these European populations demanding special privileges
based on race.101 This was similar to the Manchu and allied “bannermen,” who
demanded special ranks and privileges during their inhabitation outside of
“Manchuria” throughout the empire. Unable to become fully accepted or
empowered by their Manchu leaders, Han Chinese constantly experienced their
lives as external in a Qing multi-ethnic state. In effect, the experiences fit into
Kedourie’s concept of “marginalized man” by their diminished positions at home
and abroad. It would be abroad, where Historian Keith Schoppa argues, “Japan
served as the incubator of revolution… young Chinese men and women coming
to Japan to study at both civilian and military schools, often on government
scholarships, were turned into anti-government revolutionaries.”102
As anti-government revolutionaries, the men who went abroad often found
a communal action of cutting their queue as a point of no return and commit to
their anti-Qing ideas. A problem that often occurred to Chinese abroad was the
targeted harassment by the local populations. Often the marker for harassment
came from the queues, easily marking the Chinese for hostile engagement. One
permanent method of harassment could come from cutting their queues against
their will. Not every individual that studied or worked abroad engaged in
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revolutionary behavior, however, it was abroad that the likelihood of anti-Qing
sentiments became inflamed. Using their experiences as marginalized people in
communities abroad, the revolutionaries sometimes would cut off their queues. If
any individual without a queue desired to return, they could petition their case to
the Qing authorities. In other cases, like in the writer Lu Xun, would instead wear
a false queue on their return to China.
The increase in discriminatory experiences endured by individuals who
went abroad continued to fuel the flames of anti-Manchuism, which was taking
the form of a new wave of Ming loyalism. The prominent revolutionary, Zhang
Binglin (1868 – 1936) wrote an open letter to the Qing reformer, Kang Youwei
(1858-1927) in 1903, to advocate for effective change through revolution
because of what he saw as Manchu repressive leadership:
Today, have the Manchus assimilated to the Han people? Or
have they conquered the Han people? Manchu shamanism
is not the orthodox imperial religion; queues and jeweled
necklaces are not the Chinese caps; and the documents of
the Qing in its own language are not traditional Chinese
characters. The Manchus merely respected Confucius,
followed the ways of Confucianism and presented a false
picture as a technique for claiming the emperorship and
fooling the people. Their talk of the same race is not to turn
the Manchus into Han people, but to make the Han people
Manchus! As for the clothing and queues, [you argue that]
the Han people have become accustomed to Manchu
fashion, and even if we could go back to Song and Ming
fashions, we would feel uncomfortable with them. But do you
people not know that these queues are a barbarian fashion
instituted by force? How can we become accustomed to
them? Today five million Manchus rule over more than four
hundred million Han only because rotten traditions make the
Han stupid and ignorant. If the Han people should one day
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wake up, the Manchus would be totally unable to rest
peacefully.103

In 1900 after a public protest, Zhang took measures to support the revolutionary
cause in which he “cut off his queue as a symbolic act of defiance.”104 Zhang
follows the perception that the advocacy of a maintenance of a Neo-Confucian
reformed Qing monarchy is not one that will endure in the living hearts and minds
of the Han Chinese population. This is to say that there were some circles that
were anti-Confucian, anti-Manchu, or even both. It is worthwhile to note that at
this time, there existed a wide range of sentiments, where some overlap occurred
and the revolutionaries themselves were at the center of these movements. In
addition, it is striking that Zhang found it necessary to remind Kang that the
queue is a “barbarian fashion instituted by force.” Although he certainly could not
have truly believed that Kang did not know this, especially since the queue had
become normalized within Qing Chinese society, a point that will be further
examined below. In his response, Kang Youwei strikes a conciliatory tone:
I have found that the institutions of the sage kings and Three
dynasties [of Xia, Shang, and Zhou] were excellent, but that
ancient times were different from today. The development of
the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties may be learned,
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but it should be remembered that the age of universal
unification is different from that of sovereign nations.105
Kang advocated a more moderate path than violent revolution, following
something like the Meiji reforms of Japan, so that the Qing dynasty could endure
not in a state of tianxia (All-Under-Heaven) but one of Zhongguo (Central
Kingdom, or simply, China). This shift between tianxia to zhongguo is especially
relevant to understand why the queue became a marker for modernity within the
minds of revolutionaries. As defined by Kedourie, nationalism was a European
concept and as it was adopted by overseas revolutionaries, ideas of modernity,
nation-states, masculinity, and able-bodied citizens set the tone for the drum of
revolution. This transition of an imperial tianxia to a modern zhongguo by early
revolutionaries and members of secret societies to a more modern national
mindset solidified the resistance to the Manchus in the new era of Ming loyalism.
These rapidly spreading ideas that became intensified by the experiences in
overseas diasporas found a common medium in which they were linked, the
queue hairstyle.
While Kang did not intend to inflame anti-Manchu sentiment, his
endorsement of the national mode of thinking allowed more radical strains of
nationalism and anti-Manchu violence to emerge, often stemming from their
experiences in Japan and the West. One of the most prominent figures who
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would be hailed as a martyr for his anti-Manchu was Zou Rong (1885 – 1905).
He self-published his pamphlet, The Revolutionary Army, in 1903 and essentially
called for a Han ethno-state. His views, and views of many who would eventually
lead the 1911 revolution like Sun Yat-sen (1866 – 1925), were captured in his
pamphlet:
China should be the China of the Chinese… [t]here are inferior
foreign races, who contaminate our nation and violate the rights of
our sacred Han race; we must hesitate to sacrifice our lives to drive
them out and to restore our rights…. China is the China of the
Chinese. We compatriots should Identify ourselves with the China
of the Han race.106
This identity of the Han race would come from the ironic violation of bodily
autonomy. It is ironic since the bodily violation that these nationalist blamed on
the Manchus for the queue would come from these same revolutionaries in the
forced removal of the queues of the population. Ethnic nationalists, of which
many of the revolutionaries would belong, engaged in an intense queue cutting
campaign of their own during and after the 1911 revolution, showing a disconnect
in what the viewed their righteous actions to be, as opposed to the violation from
the Manchus in 1645. Through this queue cutting campaign, the unsuspecting
citizenry targeted by these ethnic revolutionaries who argued that the Manchus
violated their bodily autonomy by having the queue hairstyle against the will of
the Han population. To respond, these revolutionaries practiced what they
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accused the Manchus of doing themselves, violating the bodily autonomy of the
citizens that the revolutionaries believed to speak for.
The action taken by these turn-of-the-century revolutionaries was linked
with the removal of their queues.107 After several failed revolutionary movements
in the south, the success of the 1911 revolution rippled across the country as
regional militarists, disgruntled gentry, and committed revolutionaries found unity
against the Qing, often with the help of mutinous soldiers and officers of the New
Army.
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Turn-of-the-century revolutionaries refers to those who fully accepted
the anti-Manchu sentiments in the early twentieth century. These individuals are
different from the late nineteenth century reformers who engaged in pro-Qing
reform movements. The turn-of-the-century revolutionaries were largely against
Manchu rule, and rather than desiring a reform of the existing Qing state, wished
for a complete overhaul of the central state system.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE QUEUE TRADITION

The 1911 Revolution and the Legacy of the Queue
The ethnic divide that became ingrained in both systemic and bodily
institutions that without reform led to rising revolutionary arguments of individuals
like Zou Rong to spearhead revolutionary thought. These revolutionaries tapped
into an already existing argument of opposition to the Qing that had to be warped
to take the form of a new Ming-loyalism. Liberal and conservative minded
members of the Qing court had largely different approaches to enforcing their
rule. Unfortunately, the unwillingness of the conservative faction within the Qing
court by the late nineteenth century saw the argument of Ming-loyalism resurface
with intensity of “[t]he Manchus had charged, barbarized (i.e., Manchufied) the
Han when they successfully imposed their hairstyle upon Han men and their
costume upon Han officials.”108 The proposed reforms under the prominent Kang
Youwei would not come to pass and therefore the aforementioned rhetoric
resurfaced time and time again and would be center in Manchu and Han’s
relations during the early Qing conquest of China and especially during the
revolution.
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Despite the continuing violation of sovereignty from external forces in
China, mainly by Western imperialists and Japan, the internal forces continued to
see a growing hostile divide between the Manchus and Han. Despite the reforms
enacted by the Qing court in the 1900s, the words of memorialist Xiong Xiling
(1870 – 1942) failed to address the universal symbol of Qing supremacy, the
queue.109 Historian Edward J.M. Rhoads provides important narratives regarding
the reactions the citizenry had to the modernization of the police and soldiers
who received “imperial permissions to shorten, though not remove their
queue.”110 The ridicule, insults of “foreign devils” were widespread, however even
students too advocated for the removal of the queue. For Rhoads, his
perspective points to the period after 1895 as the start of when citizens
advocated for an anti-Manchu stance by many Han Chinese.111
As waves of Qing workers and students experienced places abroad and
away from China the hair was further problematized as a symbol. Diplomats,
workers, students, traders, and teachers found commonality in opposing the
queue. The queue became the link in the chain of ideas between reformers who
saw the hairstyle as out of step for a modern world, and the revolutionaries who
viewed it as a hairstyle of subservience.112
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Figure 12. Hsu Chung-Mao, "French Troops with Two Chinese in Beijing,"
Collection of a Photo History of Western Illustrations Insulting Chinese, 1900.
https://www.thinkchina.sg/photo-story-history-western-illustrations-insultingchinese (Accessed April 8, 2022)

As the commonality of the queue issue spread, relations between Han and
Manchu further deteriorated. Ideas of identity became challenged with
revolutionary insistence on using the queue to argue against the Manchus.
Uniformity of reactions to the queue question was not at the level of complete
acceptance like the revolutionaries thought. Instead, different groups responded
for different reasons to reformers and revolutionaries putting forth more petitions
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on the tonsure act. Officials, students, merchants, and others from all walks of life
had different reactions, where even Han members of these groups argued in
favor of keeping the queue because its removal would be “contrary to ancestral
customs.”113
This exact sentiment as against ancestral customs is crucial to an
important way in which scholars should consider the queue. While the
revolutionaries clearly did not wish for a society wearing the queue, there were
Chinese who had completely adopted the queue into their lifestyles. By viewing
the queue as an ancestral custom, it became an invented tradition to Han
Chinese, and therefore the revolutionary arguments against the queue had no
merit. This underrepresented perspective of the queue in scholarship shows a
more complete picture of how the Manchu tonsure was received, and how it
changed for some since 1645 when it had been viewed as a form of bodily
modification on par with castration. While there were those that did accept the
queue early in the Manchu conquest, the situation is the same for the twilight
years of the Qing dynasty. There were Chinese individuals who did not want to
remove their queues just like there were Chinese who readily adopted the queue
in 1645.
One likely attribute of contemporary scholarship onto the queue is solely a
teleological approach. Rather than viewing the queue through its end result, this
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paper critiques the approach of viewing the rapid disappearance of the queue as
a wholeheartedly anti-Manchu approach. By recognizing the changing nature of
the queue towards a Chinese identity, the narrative of the revolutionaries is
dethroned. The intensity in which revolutionaries needed to implement queue
cutting in the period surrounding the 1911 revolution testifies to the hesitancy of
the population. It is likely that there were individuals who wished to wait out the
conflict between Qing forces and the revolutionaries. Citizens recalled the turmoil
of the Taiping, where choosing the hairstyle of one group placed a target upon
themselves for the other. The Qing clearly had a wanning enforcement of the
queue by the end of their rule due to the efforts of reformers. However, the
revolutionary vigor in queue cutting must be seen as a projection of their own
identity onto their community.
Unfortunately for the Chinese who looked favorably towards the queue,
the transition from the Qing to Republican China fell to the desires of the
revolutionaries and conservative factions like with figures like Yuan Shikai (1859
– 1916). This transitional period brought with it ideas of a republican citizenry,
one in which would be born from the blood of the Manchus in bloodthirsty
hysteria, contrary to the peaceful narratives that often stemmed from the
revolutionaries.
The revolution itself in 1911 provided the ideal circumstances for
revolutionaries to exact their ethnic cleansing against the Manchus in China.
Rhoads notes “the first outburst of anti-Manchu violence occurred at the very
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beginning of the revolution….as the revolutionaries headed for the arsenal to arm
themselves, one of their rallying cries was ‘slay the Manchu officials and the
banner people.”114 The violence that emerged in various cities in such a short
time against the Manchus provides clear historical evidence that the 1911
revolution was deeply rooted in ethnic cleansing, to remove the Manchus from
China by the Han population.115 It was only after the Bannermen were severely
depleted and no longer a military threat that negotiations began with the Qing
court through Yuan Shikai and the revolutionaries.116 Yuan Shikai in his role as
prime minister and his cabinet “on Dec 7th… agreed to do away with the queue
requirement, but without making its abolition in any way mandatory; instead; it
made queue-cutting optional for all by permitting everyone, officials and
commoners alike, ‘freely to cut their hair.’”117
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This is even further complicated when scholars must recall that the
Bannermen were not a Manchu-only institution. Other ethnic groups, primarily
Mongol and Han also were present in the Eight Banner System and in the
revolutionary fervor, met the same deadly fate as their Manchu fellow
bannermen.
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Shortly after, on January 1, 1912, the Republic of China would be officially
founded by President Sun Yat-sen and the inception of a new population, of
former imperial subjects to republican citizens.118 This new citizenry saw the near
total abandonment of the queue was sponsored by the leaders of the new
Republic of China and further abandoned Manchu style institutions. The most
apparent abandonment was in the queue where Henrietta Harrison writes,
the cutting of queues was a central feature of the festivities that
began the Republic…. [a]nd yet queue cutting could also often be
an unwanted intrusion… [f]or large numbers of people the queue
had come to be part of what defined them as Chinese119
These unwanted intrusions are demonstrated by the experiences of people in
places of Suzhou, Wuxi, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Xujiahui during the QingRepublican transition.
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These republican citizens provided the ideal bodily subjects for
revolutionaries to enforce their queueless will. Prominent leaders of China during
the twentieth century had all removed their queues in the spirit of anti-Qing
revolution. Sun Yat-sen cut his own queue in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese
war. Mao Zedong cut his queue off in 1911 near the beginning of the revolution
that toppled the Manchus. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Republic of China
after Sun’s death would remove his queue in 1906. Hu Shih, a prominent leader
of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 that ushered in a new culture to China cut
his queue between 1911 and 1917 while in America. All these individuals
removed their queues as revolutionaries against the Manchu led Qing but
maintained their shorter hairstyle as supporters of a modern China. The actions
these individuals took to mark their rebellious nature against the Qing was one
that became the marker of Republican loyalty, at least to an extent.
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Figure 13. "Sun-Yat-Sen et le comité révolutionnaire chinois d'Europe" Excelsior,
December 29, 1911. https://www.thinkchina.sg/sun-yat-sen-and-xinhairevolution-pictorial-journey Contributed by Hsu Chung-mao. (Accessed April 7,
2022)

Liu Dapeng is one of those whose queue was cut against his will in the
street, and he understandably felt violated. This experience, like many others
was part of the
the queue cutting campaign launched in the early Republican
period created enormous social unrest. Various queue cutting
teams were formed and barricades were set up on the roads of
numerous cities to compulsorily remove queues of those who had
not done it… although the queue cutting campaign was celebrated
[by the new] government as patriotic. It aroused confusion,
humiliation and resentment among the Chinese.120

Pinkerton, “Control, Allegiance, and Shame in Male Qing Dynasty
Hairstyles,” 53.
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Figure 14. "Freedom by Force: Compelled to Lose a Badge of Servitude," The
Illustrated London News, March 2, 1912. https://www.thinkchina.sg/sun-yat-senand-xinhai-revolution-pictorial-journey Contributed by Hsu Chung-mao (Accessed
March 28, 2022)
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Scholarly arguments against the ethnic goals of revolutionaries are
complicated by the monumental action of the new leader of China, President
Sun-Yat sen. Sun undertook an offering of respect to the tomb of the first Ming
emperor tomb soon after his official rise to power. By doing this in Nanjing it drew
parallels between the foundation of the Ming and the foundation of the Republic
of China.121 Sun’s words at the tomb revitalized spirits of Ming loyalism when he
expressed “that now after 260 years the nation had again recovered her freedom,
and prophesied glory and prosperity for a united free China.”122 This view that
freedom had been achieved with the fall of the Qing, demonstrates the centrality
of the ethnic argument to the revolutionary cause for figures like Sun.

Nanjing served as the original Ming capital from 1368 – 1421 before
being moved to Beijing by the Yongle Emperor.
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Figure 15. "The Rape of the Lock," The Graphic, April 6, 1912. Contributed by
Hsu Chung-mao. https://www.thinkchina.sg/sun-yat-sen-and-xinhai-revolutionpictorial-journey (accessed March 31, 2022)

When the dust settled following the violent ethnic cleansing of many
Manchus in the 1911 revolution, the de facto leader of the revolution and
underground secret societies, Sun Yat-sen, confirmed the bridging between
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Ming-loyalism and anti-Manchusim. Frederic Wakeman clarified this connection
in a 2006 lecture at the University of California, San Diego:
When Sun Yat Sen, the father of the country, came north to Beijing
in 1912 to celebrate the revolutionaries’ victory over the Manchus,
his first ceremonial act was to visit the Ming tombs west of the
capital. There he claimed that ethnic resistance to the Manchus had
vanished among the upper classes after the Qing conquest. But
that Han nationalism had been preserved among the lower orders
[the people] who had led the triad secret societies underground to
“overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming.”123
Sun’s words and action, by standing at the Ming tombs and declaring the
restoration of the Ming and the overthrow of the Qing, established a system
where ethnic Hans could rule once more. This “modern” China that removed its
imperial rituals was founded from the spark of severing the queue, finalized by
the new “great enterprise” of the revolutionaries in fulfilling the dreams of ethnic
Ming loyalism.
When the reins of power were shifted from Sun to Yuan Shikai, one
western diplomat named Paul S. Reinsch met the new President of the Republic,
Yuan.124 He writes, “[w]hen he received me informally, he donned the uniform of

“Ming Nativism and the Local Turn,” The Last Millennium of Chinese History:
Transitions from Culture to Nation (University of California, San Diego: University
of California Television, 2006),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIxn7_b1CJI&ab_channel=UniversityofCalifo
rniaTelevision%28UCTV%29.
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Paul S. Reinsch was not merely an individual from the west or trader
who frequented the country. Reinsch was in an official capacity a representative
of the United States in China before, during, and after the 1911 revolution. His
firsthand experiences testify to the rapid changes that had occurred in this QingRepublican transition.
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state and always wore a long Chinese coat. He had retained the distinction and
refinement of Chinese manners, with a few additions from the West, such as
shaking hands. His cue [queue] he had abandoned in 1912, when he decided to
become President of the Republic.”125 In addition to Yuan’s presentation, the
story of Yuan’s own queue was also infamous from a conversation between
Admiral Tsai and Yuan himself. It was said that the admiral advised him to cut his
hair and Yuan sent for a pair of scissors and said “[i]t is your advice. You carry it
out.” Reinsch also notes that with this action Yuan became “a modern man.”126
Yuan becoming a modern man was also enforced onto the larger population
where Yuan mandated queue cutting in Beijing, where his power base was
located, as well as in the same location that the imperial family was still living.

The Queue and Lu Xun
Lu Xun (1881 – 1936), the father of modern Chinese literature is one
figure reveals the subconscious importance of the queue in his short stories.127
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Lu Xun became one of the most influential Chinese writers of the twentieth
century. He is part of the revolutionary generation, having grown up during the
Qing and lived through the imperial and early republican period. Lu Xun wrote
popular short stories, often inserting his experiences into the stories and wrote
them in the vernacular. By writing in the vernacular style, he turned away from
the old literary practices of the Confucian gentry officials and their classical style
of Chinese. Lu Xun therefore becomes a standard of revolutionary ideas that
people turned to for a modern Chinese society, especially with his publications in
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By using the queue to analyze his short stories, he brings to life a part of his
personal and communal life. For instance, his “The Story of Hair” is based in part
on his own experience with the queue. In the story, the narrator explains how it is
the anniversary of October revolution of 1911 while looking at his calendar. An
older man comes and explains the suffering of the Chinese people over hair.
Reminiscing over the role of the queue in Chinese history beginning with the
1645 edict of the Qing, he further continued;
Whenever we used to talk of revolting against the Manchus, we we’d
always make a big thing of the Ten Days at Yangzhou and the
Butchering of Jiading, but that was just a little trick we used. The
intensity of the resistance we Chinese put up against the Manchus
at the time of the Republican Revolution had next to nothing to do
with the atrocities committed by the Manchus when they destroyed
us as a nation and a people a few centuries back. If the truth be
known, we were simply sick and tired of wearing those queues.
Once we had all actually gotten used to wearing the queue, then
along came Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqin [leaders of the Taiping
Rebellion]. My grandmother once told me that the common people
were put in a real bind then; the ones who let their hair grow out
were killed by the government troops, and the ones who still did their
hair up were killed by the Long Hairs [Taping rebels undid their
braids and allowed their forelock to grow]. When I went overseas to
study I cut off my queue. There was no particular significance to my
act – I simply did it because wearing the darned thing was so
inconvenient…. Some of my fellow students who had coiled their

the immensely popular magazine titled New Youth. Lu Xun would go on to
become a professor at the prestigious Peking University, and Beijing Normal
University. Lu Xun’s academic reach in periodicals like New Youth would become
the publication through which intellectuals, workers, and learned peasants would
gain ideas of an idea of a new China. This period, known as the New Culture
Movement, would also coincide with the May 4th Movement and see the
intensifying of Chinese nationalism. All these movements were part of the time
and movement of which Lu Xun was a representative of.
96

queues up on top of their heads absolutely detested me because I
had cut mine off!128
Lu Xun’s experience expressed through the short story speaks volumes to
the symbolism of the queue in the years of the Qing. Ming loyalism of the early
Qing rule over China witnessed defiance to the edict over allegiance to the
former Ming. Scholars can recall the event of Xu Yongde mentioned previously
where he hung a portrait of the Ming founder and expressed loyalty to the Ming
emperor. Continuing with Lu Xun’s story, when the Taiping Rebellion considered
the Manchus as demons marked for eradication, the hairstyle once again was
changed for political expression, though this time it was not out of Ming loyalism
but for separation from the demonic Manchus. In contrast, we must recall that
some supporters of the Taiping were in fact Ming-loyalists in search of
establishing once more a Han ethno-state. The rebels were known as the Long
Hairs, where the people not affiliated with either party were killed by the opposing
party, sometimes identified based on how they wore their hair.
Continuing, the narrator of the story informs the audience that the reason
he cut off his own queue was simply for comfort, not any of the aforementioned
reasons. The negative reaction of his classmates to his queue cutting also
provides a lens from which observers can gauge imperial loyalty, where they
perceived the cutting of the queue as disloyalty to the dynasty. These different
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perspectives on the queue show the complexity of meanings behind hair growth
and hair removal under the Qing. Not every individual who went abroad joined in
anti-Manchu sentiments given the ridicule the narrator experienced. However. it
would be difficult to gauge how widespread the queue cutting sentiments were in
relation to strong anti-Manchu sentiments in the final decade of the Qing and
during the revolution. What is clear is the message queue cutting played in the
roles of the revolutionaries themselves, especially in the context in which they
are involved in the overthrow of the Qing.
The perception of these revolutionaries directly contributed the queue as a
symbol of their marginalized countrymen. This type of argument that would be
rooted by experiences in the revolutionary incubator that was Japan from some
figures like the author. Lu Xun cut off his own hair while in Japan in 1902 as a
youth studying abroad, demonstrating his own experience coming through the
characters he brought to life in his short stories.129
In his story Remembrances of the Past, he recalls panic in a village in
1911 when news arrives of the approaching Taiping rebels. This approaching
group of rebels became the hottest news story in the village and were referred to
as “The Long Hairs.”130 The ensuing anxieties amongst the villagers prompted
the youngsters to inquire to the elders as to the look and actions taken by the
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long hairs over forty years earlier. Villagers began to evacuate with goods they
could carry until the news came that the approaching group were refugees, not
long hairs. With the panic over, the village would soon return to normal. Though
the Taiping had been long gone by 1911, this particular memory seemed to bring
to the surface fears that were very real, especially the constant reminder that
one’s hair marked where one’s loyalties lay.
In A Passing Storm, the character Sevenpounder finds news of the
restoration movement of Zhang Xun of the Xuantong Emperor, Puyi. He passes
on his news to his wife, Sister Sevenpounder who “was momentarily thrown for a
loss, but then the light suddenly dawned on her as she decided exactly what that
must mean.”131 Originally her view was one celebration, however, Sevenpounder
notifies her that he does not have his queue, a hairstyle that he is certain the
emperor will reimplement. Sister Sevenpounder then “[g]lancing at
Sevenpounder’s queue-less head … could not help but feel angry. She blamed
him, she hated him, she resented him, and then quite suddenly, she sank into
despair.”132 Gauging the reaction of Sister Sevenpounder, scholars can recognize
that once more the queue signaled who bent to the revolutionary mindset of a
queue-less society in a modern republic and those that still supported the Qing.
This is evident in Zhang Xun, the “pigtail general” who even through the
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revolution, the declaration of Yuan Shikai’s own dynasty, and after it fell would
still where his queue proudly and unmolested.
The story continues with Seventh Master Zhao entering: “the front half of
his skull was shaved and shiny, while the jet-black hair on the back had been
gathered into a queue.”133 He no longer wore his queue coiled around his head
as he had done after the 1911 revolution. His appearance confirmed to Sister
Sevenpounder that the restoration had indeed succeeded, given that Seventh
Master Zhao was a learned individual. He even informed the individuals of the
importance of hair by referring to the Taiping rebels. Sister Sevenpounder then
proceeds to ridicule her husband, causing another bystander, Sister Bayi, to
interject and note that Sister Sevenpounder herself did not speak up at the time
of her husband’s own queue removal. Master Zhao embodied the people who
still championed the hairstyle regardless of who sat in power. This was not
necessarily because those who viewed their queue as part of their own identity,
but rather for self-preservation in a time where the citizenry recognized the
unstableness of the new Republican government. Eventually time passed and
the news came that the restoration had failed, and Seventh Master Zhao would
coil his queue above his head once more, and Sevenpounder returned to his
former prestige within the community. The action of Master Zhao however is
interesting. Even with a failed restoration attempt to bring the emperor Puyi back
on the throne he still refused to remove his queue.
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By returning to coiling his queue around his head, Lu Xun provides two
possible interpretations of Zhao. The first is that the queue is part of his own
identity, and it did not matter who was in power, he would not relinquish his
bodily autonomy. The second is that he is a member of self-serving individuals or
opportunists, who only look out for themselves and not basing one’s perspective
on the socio-political climate of the day. The answer may well lie in the former
given that Master Zhao did not remove his queue at any given moment even
after the success of the revolution and avoiding the hair cutting brigades of the
revolutionaries turned republicans.
Knowing that Lu Xun draws on his life experiences for his short stories
scholars can consider another question. Is the character of Master Zhao one
conjured up to represent loyalty to the queue and by extension the Qing? Or is
the character meant to resemble people whom Lu Xun himself encountered while
these events transpired? With these questions in mind, Lu Xun’s next story
provides another lens to observe the queue.
In one of his grandest tales, Ah Q – The Real Story, Lu Xun continued to
highlight the effect of the queue in the individual Ah Q. This story of an individual
who continuously found himself in conflict would frequently be grabbed by his
“discolored queue” and frequently beaten in a beastly manner, making a
connection that his turned Ah Q into a figure that was sub-human134 When Ah Q
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fought with the character Bearded Wang, he “grabbed Ah Q’s queue, twisted it
fast, and prepared to drag him over to the wall and smack his head against it in
the time-honored fashion.”135 Ah Q later witnessed the son of Old Master Qian
return from Japan “and his queue was gone.”136 The removal of the queue was
not according to Old Master Qian’s son’s wishes; it was forced on him. Here
evidence is once again presented about the importance overseas experiences
had to anti-Manchu or Ming-loyalist ideas. Especially given the importance that
Japan had in demonstrating that it was indeed the “incubator” of revolutionary
thoughts and people.
Continuing, Ah Q is an interesting character, continuously engaging into
conflicts even when losing. When word of the spread of the revolutionary’s plight
reached his ear, Ah Q even noted that people in the town saw the revolutionaries
as “wearing a white helmet – obviously in mourning for the Emperor Chong
Zhen.”137 A revival of Ming loyalism can be perceived through Lu Xun’s writing
into his tale of Ah Q, even if Lu Xun himself did not advocate for this idea. This
allows the reader to see a glimpse of a bridge between Ming loyalism and antiManchuism even at a surface level of works that did not have Ming loyalist
intentions. This is further proven when the story progresses, and Ah Q learns that
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the revolutionaries had taken the town. They had implemented name changes to
positions, but nearly everything else in town remained the same. A difference
occurred with “some bad elements had slipped into the Revolutionary Party and
started lopping queues off the day after they arrived in town.”138 Scholars know
Lu Xun based these observations within his story on his own first-hand
experiences with the fanatical queue cutting revolutionaries deployed across the
urban and rural landscapes. Demonstrating the connectedness of the authors
storytelling, the boatman from “A Passing Storm” also makes an appearance in
this tale. Sevenpounder’s tale of him having his queue cut off and “no longer
looked even human.”139 This perception is another window in which we the rapid
practice of coiling the queue spread throughout the Wei village, where it noted
the anxiety surrounding the queue. This village again hints at the possibility that
there were widespread individuals across China that felt as Master Zhao did in
the previous story.
These short stories combined with the firsthand experience of Liu Dapeng
provide evidence to meaningful adoption of the queue amongst the Chinese
population that existed outside of a legal mandate. That is to say that the queue
is demonstrated to have been an invented tradition and problematized the
narrative of subservience by Han nationalists. Lu Xun’s stories provide a mirror
into the sentiments of not only himself but also the local population. These

138

Lu, 155.

139

Lu, 155.
103

experiences must not be discounted from official narratives by scholars of
modern China. Voices such as these are crucial to understanding the complexity
surrounding the identity of the queue. In addition, the comparison of those who
went abroad without becoming a part of the revolutionary sentiments are also
necessary. The everyday person who likely did experience the maliciousness of
being abroad in “modern” countries did not turn to revolutionary cause en masse.
Those that did found representation in the literary works of Lu Xun who became
the voice of this generation of workers, scholars, everyday people.

Figure 16. Sha, Fei, photographer. "Lu Xun attending the Second Woodcarving
Exhibition in Baxianqiao," Shanghai, China. October 8, 1936.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lu_Xun_1936.jpg (Accessed November
19, 2021)
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The Chinese Abroad, Marked by the Queue
The United States is one of the most heavily researched nations when
speaking of the experience of Chinese abroad. The push or pull of going abroad
came from different sources depending on the individual wants of those that went
abroad. Perhaps the best place to begin regarding motivations to go abroad for
some Chinese came from the turmoil surrounding Ming restoration movements.
One such movement is in the White Lotus Rebellion from 1796 to 1804 in the
South of China. The peasantry in the south, such as in Guangdong province saw
deep rooted lineages “which linked all families – regardless of socioeconomic
standings – with a common ancestry.”140 The unfolding of the White Lotus
Rebellion shattered many of these familiar lineages where families would have to
support one another in a greater capacity. In addition, the motives behind the
rebellion also brought the populace who were not in favor of the Ming restoration
movements into contact with their doctrine. Regardless, what is clear is that the
turmoil of the rebellion did provide one of many socio-economic situations for
Chinese individuals to seek livelihoods outside of China.
As previously discussed, the Taiping Rebellion of 1850 from 1864 would
become the largest open display of sedition against the Qing that brought more
destruction to the southern provinces like Guangdong. It was from the war-torn

140

Benson Tong, The Chinese Americans (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 2000), 15.
105

South that communities like the US and Mexico would see an influx of
immigration. This Immigration would ultimately “involve as many as 2.5 million
people between 1840 and 1900” of “young, economically displaced men.” 141
Though war-torn places saw widespread displacement, this did not mean
that the poorest of society were the only people to immigrate abroad. Already an
expensive and dangerous prospect, what often occurred was families with the
economic means would often fund not only the overseas voyage itself, but also
and fees that would need to be paid.142 For the extremely poor, the high cost of
overseas voyages was not within the means, therefore this discredits narratives
that only the poor of Chinese society went abroad. Those that went to the US
were primarily male and came also for the “pull” factor of the gold found in
California in the mid nineteenth century.
The experiences of these Chinese males in California and in other
Western places, including Japan, touched on ideas of masculinity and disability
to Chinese individuals. It was on these ideas of an ideal able-bodied person and
masculine presentation that would demonstrate why it was overseas Chinese
who spearheaded new wave anti-Manchu sentiments. The intensity of which
queue cutting became a center policy practiced by revolutionaries on their return
to China is linked to what this paper terms “disabling masculinity.” Disabling
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masculinity is a concept at the intersection of race, gender, and disability. It
considers several ways in which Chinese men in society were “othered” and
excluded from full civic participation in Western nations. The first theme was the
racialized aspect of the queue, in which Chinese individuals were uniformly
linked into a singular homogenous unit under a queued hairstyle. The second
theme was in the expression of a gendered society, by which western practices
created and championed a normalcy of able-bodiedness of its citizens along
established gendered norms, by which citizenship and work were connected to
full able-bodied humanity. Those who did not strictly fit this often white, male
definition, including women, African Americans, Native Americans, and Chinese
migrants, were excluded from the normative definition of able-bodied, and in the
field of disability studies, scholars have begun to examine the violence and
exclusions of these definitions.
The last theme was the projected disabling characteristics of the queue,
by which instead of the queue causing a physical impairment that hindered
Chinese individuals from participation in their direct society, the disabling factor
was the projected idea of an impairment that westerners used to prevent their full
participation in western communities. Professor of Disability Studies and History
at the University of Toledo, Kim E. Neilson, credits this third theme with the
exclusion at Angel Island in San Francisco where the consensus was that
Chinese bodies were incapable of motivating themselves for self-governance and
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therefore were too disabled for democracy.143 Othered by race and gender, the
queue was a signifier of a societal impairment, where the Center for Disease
Control defines impairment as “an absence of or significant difference in a
person’s body structure, or function, or mental functioning.” To the West, the
belief in an impairment accompanied those that wore a queue, the Chinese male,
and these beliefs were founded on Western constructions of acceptable degrees
of normalcy within their society. These three themes, when viewed together
demonstrated that disabling masculinity was a force of oppression based on
Western constructions of race, gender, and able-bodiedness, a projection of
hyper masculinity that disabled the Chinese body.
Disabling masculinity was intersection of these Western projections and
can be considered within the social disability model. This model follows the
definition of society as the “disabling” force more than the “disabling”
characteristic, or impairment itself. Therefore, disabling masculinity was one of
the marginalizing cultural forces that became part of the experiences of Chinese
individuals in the diasporic communities. The queue did not physically impair the
Chinese male, but it did socially disable them in Western societies. In this way
“disability is something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled
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people are therefore an oppressed group in society.”144 The queue therefore was
the marker that unnecessarily isolated and excluded Chinese males from
becoming accepted into the full participation of Western society, becoming the
targets of discriminatory legislation and physical abuses because of their
“foreign” hairstyle.
The Chinese individuals experienced varying degrees of hostility in the US
in large part to the negative and feminized stigma associated with the queue. If
looking at the queue in this manner provides any insight at all, it is recognizing
how the queue was not only seen as a visible identifier of a people but also
represented by National Geographic in 1913 “describing the national pigtail as a
dangling appendage” to embody the culmination of decades of projected “racial
and gender ideology.”145 This reference of a dangling appendage is one that is
continually challenged by scholars such as Lisa Bloom who chastised National
Geographic for “comparing the phallic power of an idealized fantasy image” to
“400 million Chinese patriots.”146 This idealized imagery portrayed by National
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Geographic is a common projection of Orientalist ideas, where things from the
East were an exotic place of wonder in which the West alone could interpret.
One important pull factor that helped to motivate willing people to further
their economic prospects abroad came in the form of the Burlingame Treaty of
1868. This treaty was a monumental action by the Manchu Qing, on par with the
queue edict itself of 1645 particularly from how one would affect the other. By
signing this treaty “the Qing government finally recognized the right of the
Chinese people to emigrate to America, ending the three-hundred-year ban on
overseas migration.”147 This pact eliminated any punishments that would be
experienced by Chinese individuals who went abroad. In addition, their friends
and families who remained would also be free from repercussions through direct
or familial association.
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Figure 17. Keller, G.F. "Devastation," Wikimedia Commons, The Wasp, October
2, 1880. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Devastation__G._F._Keller_2_October_1880_(cropped).jpg (Accessed April 7, 2022)148

Conflict that emerged from armed warfare such as the White Lotus and
Taiping Rebellions in the Southern provinces destabilized the region. These
destabilized places experienced fewer substantial economic opportunities
available to people and so those able to seek work flocked to the southern
Guangdong Province and then to Hong Kong to sail to the United States. Those
able to board a ship sailed first to San Francisco and then spread out from there
to the various locations across the country, mostly the Chinatowns in major cities.
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One important distinction to be made from the migratory spread away from San
Francisco is that not all experiences were uniform. Individuals in the same city
experienced different acts of violence, discrimination, and exclusions, and this
also extended to different places such as New York City.
For instance, the Chinese immigrants in New York during the 1860s and
earlier would assimilate in similar ways their European immigrant counterparts
did. Some examples of these included the adoption of Anglo-American names,
become US citizens, and even marry European or American women.149 This
would drastically change in the following decades because though the early New
York Chinese immigrants “Americanized” they still had strong pulls back to the
mainland, largely from Confucian practices. Xinyang Wang notes that “[f]or many
decades, Chinese immigrants in New York were concerned primarily with the
latest happenings in China, especially in their hometowns, rather than with
events in the United States.”150 The pull towards the homeland is an important
standard that overseas revolutionaries would eventually rally behind. Using their
marginalized and secluded experiences, these same revolutionaries would often
raise money for their revolution through the overseas Chinese laborers who often
cared deeply about the situations back home on the mainland.
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Over time, remaining in the US and returning to the homeland shifted in
meaning based on individual cases, stemming from monetary or even habitual
needs of the laborer. The discrimination received by Chinese laborers intensified
the desire to realize Confucian practices of remaining where one’s ancestors lay,
rather than being laid to rest in the diaspora. A closer examination reveals that
studies of European immigration suggest that, although many
factors in the New World [North and South America], and especially
discrimination against the newcomers, were responsible for
continued return migration, these factors merely strengthened the
immigrants’ intention to return home. As we shall see shortly,
before embarking for America, the emigrants had already made
plans for eventually going back to their native villages.151
Due to the premade plans of returning home, the common nature of Chinese
migrants were temporary, evident from the round trip plans as explained by
Wang.152 This would become evident in the death rituals surrounding the Chinese
communities where there would be a communal movement up to ten years after
death where the deceased would have the bones excavated from local
cemeteries and sent back to China.153 In addition to round trips, these men
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would also travel alone, not having women or wives join them on their trips in the
beginning due to cultural practices of having women take care of the home, and
later due to discriminatory legislation from the United States.154 This left two
options for Chinese migrants, either assimilate to their place of residence in the
diaspora or return home to rejoin their family units due to the targeted
discrimination. This emerging discriminatory legislation often would be easily
targeted to the Chinese from the easily identifiable queue of subjects of the Qing
Empire, becoming a racialized hairstyle that encompassed all citizens from
China, regardless of their ethnic group. In addition, the threat of lost money in
local economies also played a role in this discrimination policies, where
employers and competing laborers did not approve of the Chinese worker
sending their wages back home. This practice of sending wages to the mainland
would also culminate in a more frugal lifestyle, one which would further racialize
and cause further discrimination towards the Chinese by ethnic supremacist in
the US.
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Figure 18. Nast, Thomas. "Let the Chinese Embrace Civilization, and They May
Stay," UDel-Walfred, March 18, 1882. (Accessed April 7, 2022)

Due to rising sentiments of racial and ethnic supremacy within the local
population, the United States quickly adopted policies of Sinophobia that were
already prevalent from the local and state levels with large Chinese populations.
One example is under the administration of Ulysses S. Grant in 1875 in the form
of the Page Act, in response the rising number of Chinese immigrants because of
the Qing’s Burlingame Treaty. This act in its final form gave the US the authority
to ban the immigration of Chinese women under the premise that they were
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mostly arriving to the US to be prostitutes.155 The consequences of the Page Act
had greater effects than just the exclusion of Chinese women from joining their
family in the US. One such consequence was in the shift in skills that the
Chinese men would come to develop that they would have not had obtained
while in China. These Chinese men without women “had to learn domestic skills
(and even use them to eke out a livelihood, as in doing laundry) which reinforced
that appreciation.”156
It was the rise of “domestic skills” that would ultimately accelerate further
hostility to Chinese males with the attribute of stigma. Erving Goffman writes that
stigma is linguistically tied to the Greeks who relied on visual aids to expose
“something unusual or bad.”157 In addition, Goffman posits the question that is
crucial to understanding how the queue actively shaped experiences of the
Chinese; “does the stigmatized individual assume his differentness is known
about already or is evident on the spot, or does he assume it is neither known
about by those present nor immediately perceivable by them?”158 By getting to

National Park Service, “Ulysses S. Grant, Chinese Immigration, and the
Page Act of 1875” Ulysses S Grant National Historic Site, accessed December
21, 2021, https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/ulysses-s-grant-chinese-immigrationand-the-page-act-of-1875.htm.
155

156

Tong, The Chinese Americans, 33.

Erving Goffman, “Selections from Stigma” in The Disability Studies
Reader, Fifth Edition. Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2017), 133.
157

Lerita M. Coleman-Brown, “Stigma: An Enigma Demystified” in The
Disability Studies Reader, Fifth Edition. Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge,
2017), 135.
158

116

the hostile perceptions that were guided by the easily identifiable hairstyle
scholars can further gauge how these experiences help present a widespread
case of disabling masculinity.
The American perception towards the Chinese queue is not only a
testament to the fragility of a “white identity” during the eighteenth and nineteenth
century, but also a true testament to societal changes of the time.159 The case of
an American Magazine like National Geographic pejoratively describing the
Chinese queue as a “dangling appendage” is one example. As modern nations
were continually creating and remaking their perceived ideas of an ideal modern
man, so too did ideas of established gender roles become more defined between
Chinese and American bodies.
Magazine and newspaper periodicals of the Chinese queue in the early
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century were indistinguishable from
Western reality. That is to say, that the writings within these works often
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portrayed Western perceptions exactly as the people themselves ignorantly
perceived the queue. This perception was one of increased feminization and
constant comparisons with animals that exposed the insecurities surround
threats to male dominance in the West.160 It was these portrayals that Historian
Rachel Bright of Keele University repurposes Ross Forman’s words “that such
fictional depictions acted as a symbolic castration.”161 The symbolic role of
castration fell into the realm of disabling masculinity, where the idea of castration
was internalized to represent the queue. The idea of challenged masculinity saw
the individuals from diaspora communities become inclined to their own sense of
a strong, modern, and able-bodied self-image. The Orientalist “white experts”
continued gendered judicial discrimination to Chinese men on the basis of
masculinity. They viewed themselves as professionals who as Bright stated, “not
just understand the Chinese [through their hair] but control the Chinese.”162 It is
this perception that Foucault’s biopolitics as well as the socialized aspect of
disability can be useful within the Chinese experience.
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Figure 19. Nast, Thomas. "Throwing Down the Ladder By Which They Rose,"
July 23, 1870. https://thomasnastcartoons.com/2015/01/06/throwing-down-theladder-by-which-they-rose-23-july-1870/ (Accessed April 7, 2022)

The Page Act’s barring of Chinese women into the United States
continued to add to the negative gendered stigma of Chinese men and intensified
the perceived femininity of the Chinese male body. One example of the American
mind surrounding the Chinese in America comes from the first-person accounts
of Reverend Otis Gibson. His observation of the male Chinese is,
[a]ll day long, and often until late at night, the streets are crowded
with Chinamen of all ages and sizes, and speaking various dialects,
with shaven crown and neatly braided cue, sauntering lazily along,
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talking, visiting, trading, laughing, and scolding in the strangest,
and, to an American, the most discordant jargon.”163
In addition, the reverend remarks on the role of Chinese civilization in his
contemporary modern world of 1877 as follows: “the whole civilization of China
has stood still for ages, and has become like one great stagnant pool. To purify it,
it needs to be moved and stirred from center to circumference by contact and
friction with the Christian civilization of American and Europe,”164 Gibson
observes that once the overly crowded steam ships arrive in port and the
examination process at the docks is completed, the Chinese male would take to
the streets but the “hoodlums” would often “follow the Chinaman through the
streets, howling and screaming after him to frighten him. They catch hold of his
cue [queue], and pull him from the wagon.”165 Repeatedly he makes observations
on the appearance of the Chinese male, identifiable by his “feminine dress” but
also by the “queue” “the men with shaven crown and braided cue.”166 In
observing a barbershop he sees the process with “the head and face are washed
in warm water, but no lather is used. See this performance. The head is shaved,
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the face is shaved, the forehead is shaved, the ears are scraped, and the cue is
braided.”167 In actuality, in rationalizing the practice of the queue, Gibson writes,
[t]his shaving of the head and braiding of the cue [queue] is a very
singular custom, but is universal among the Chinese; and although
thousands of these in America would be glad to adopt our customs
of wearing the hair - at least while in this country - still such is the
power of custom and prejudice that a chinaman loses caste, and is
tabooed by his countrymen, as soon as he makes the innovation
and cuts off his cue [queue]. Even those who in their hearts would
like to do such a thing, openly ridicule the change. This shaving the
head and wearing the cue is not, as many people suppose, a
religious custom at all. It has more to do with the religion of the
Chinese, their religious rites and ceremonies, than has an
American barbershop to do with the sacraments of the Christian
religion…. It is probable that one-half of the Chinese in America
would really be glad to adopt our fashions in this matter if there
could be a general move in that direction. But if they should do this,
on returning to China custom would compel them to resume the
cue and the Chinese dress.168
Gibson’s account as a westerner perceiving the bodies of the Chinese
explains how those in America viewed their Chinese neighbors. He assumes that
the Chinese would readily accept the western style if given the opportunity.
However, Gibson notes that the Chinese men would be the subject of ridicule
upon returning home. The former point will be addressed again; however, the
latter is immediately striking. It is easily recognizable and verifiable that a queueless male returning to China would be frowned upon by the society around them,
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especially as already demonstrated from Lu Xun in his short stories. What is
particularly fascinating is the take those Chinese men would readily accept the
shorter hair. This is one aspect that is vital for the diasporic experience in
comparison to the mainland Chinese. When the revolution came and went,
Chinese individuals in American Chinatowns were located far from the reach of
the Qing and armed revolutionaries of the mainland. Much like in the mainland,
the queues in the diasporas too disappeared. The question that must be asked is
did these queues disappear willingly, or were these individuals subject to queue
cutting brigades like on the mainland.
Another aspect that is available for examination lies in the funeral
practices of those buried outside of China to see what custom was adopted in
burials. It is in this window that without an explicitly intact record, at best a few
guesses can be made surrounding the queue, or lack thereof. In Carlin, Nevada
there was a discovery of thirteen graves of Chinese individuals from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. These individuals are of particular interest
for two reasons. The first is the location being outside of the traditional
communities that existed in big city Chinatowns, often by the coast. The second
is in how their hair was prepared for the burial.
The hair of the individual in Burial 2 was braided into a queue that
was thirty centimeters [11.8 inches] long, Black woven cordage was
braided into his queue to extend it by another sixty-five centimeters
[25.59 inches]. The hair of the individuals in Burials 1, 5, 6, and 7

122

was short, but a false queue of braided woven cordage was. Placed
beneath, or perhaps attached to, the head of each.169

Though the editors of this volume state that the presence of these queues
suggests that these graves date prior to 1911, it would be incredibly fascinating
to verify if any of these are dated past the 1911 revolution. Regardless, the
presence of false queues presents an interesting discussion that is ripe for
further analysis. One potential explanation for the presence of false queues may
be due to the three dominant philosophies of China [Buddhism, Confucianism,
and Daoism].
These three faiths intersected and influenced funerary practices over the
centuries, making it impossible for any individual custom to be independent of the
other. In addition, by encountering the West and wearing the shorter western
style there also shows that new cultural contact continued to influence funerary
rituals. This is especially evident if scholars consider the words of Chung and
Wegars that, “the highly ritualized Chinese funerary ceremonies represented a
means by which individuals found comfort in the community during a time of
despair.”170 Even if those interred with false queues adopted the shorter western
hairstyle for anti-Manchu revolutionary sentiments, there is no denying that it was
important enough a ritual to include a queue with their body. It is likely possible

169

Chung and Wegars, Chinese American Death Rituals: Respecting the
Ancestors, 125.
170

Chung and Wegars, 31.
123

that the queue was still important enough to one’s identity that a false queue was
desired either by the deceased themselves or an associate who prepared the
burial.
Furthermore, the Chinese laborers already experienced economic
hardships in the United States even while being a reason behind the
connectedness of the country with the railroad where Benedict Tong illustrates
that “12,000 estimated Chinese are estimated to have built the Central Pacific
Railroad.”171 The country responded with federal legislation barring Chinese
women from joining their husbands, brothers, and fathers. As the “domestic”
labor was picked up as skills for Chinese individuals, California began to impose
ordinances to further target the Chinese. The infamous queue ordinance and the
Cubic air law was legislation meant to target the Chinese body, proposed and
enforced by American bodies who projected their disabling masculinity through
legislation.
Due to the physical differences in both the body and created practices of
the Chinese, Tong writes that “anything deemed Chinese - bodies, clothing, and
cultural differences - became marketable public spectacle. [In addition,] racial
caricatures became the standard vocabulary of a visual culture.”172 By being a
visual culture, scholars can see the effects of one targeted legislation that not
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only provides insight into sentiments of Sinophobic Americans, but also the
Chinese understand of the legal code and finding support to fight their targeting.
The infamous case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan in California was in response
to an ordinance in San Francisco that mandated every male imprisoned person
to have their hair “cut or clipped to [a] uniform length of one inch from the
scalp”173 Knowing the specifics surrounding how the queue hairstyle was worn, it
is evident that this law was designed to target the Chinese male population. Ho
Ah Kow was imprisoned for violating the 1878 San Francisco Cubic Air Law that
“require[ed] 500 cubic feet of space for every person residing in a lodging.” 174
This law was violated by Ho Ah Kow and many other Chinese due to societal and
political pressures restricting the Chinese males to Chinatowns. Urban planning
limited the general location of where Chinese individuals could reside. With these
limitations, boarding practices by the Chinese workers saw a large number of
inhabitants reside in singular locations. This allowed targeted regulation for
queue wearers against Chinese individuals like Ho Ah Kow. When arrested, Ho
Ah Kow was placed in jail and forcibly had his queue cut off, risking his safety
upon the return to China and violating his bodily autonomy. His legal defense
argued, “it is custom of Chinamen to shave the hair from the front of the head
and to wear the remained of it braided into a queue; that the deprivation of the
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queue is regarded by them as a mark of disgrace, and is attended, according to
their religious faith, with misfortune and suffering after death.”175
Recognizing the fatal punishment that the Qing imposed upon what was
considered open sedition of not wearing the queue, especially merely a decade
after the bloody Taiping Rebellion kept the threat of sedition very much alive. Ho
Ah Kow was one of many who recognized their predicament if they returned to
China without their queue. This very sentiment was accurately portrayed by his
attorneys. This convincing defense even had one Judge Cooley makes a
distinctive note that the Chinese man would “prefer [torture] to that which entails
upon him disgrace among his countrymen and carries with it the constant dread
of misfortune and suffering after death.”176 This shows the societal factors
involved with the queue, given that the queue itself did not cause bodily harm as
a border substance, but brought about harm in other ways to Chinese individuals.
Chinese experiences in the US became much more difficult in addition to
hyper racialized and hypersexualized projections of American disabling
masculinity. The “gendered and sexualized perceptions of Chinese people,
compounded by economic downturn (1873 - 1896), became the ground for
legalized Chinese exclusion in 1882.”177 The infamous exclusion of Chinese from
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entry into the United States came in the form of two California senators, John F.
Miller and Horace Page who brought anti-Chinese on a national level to a new
height.
Miller argued that “America belonged to white people and white people
only… why aid in the increase and distribution over our domain of a degraded
and inferior race, and the progenitors of an inferior sort of men?”178 This bill
introduced in 1881 would be vetoed by President Chester Arthur, however a
following bill proposed by Page barred but “merchants, teachers, students, and
their household servants” from the United States would be passed on May 6,
1882, as the Chinese Exclusion Act.179 Following the Act saw violence occur
against the remaining Chinese with ethnic cleansing of various levels across the
country: Tacoma, Washington saw its nearly 600 Chinese expelled to Portland.
Seattle, Washington saw mob violence against the Chinese to such an extent
that martial law was declared by Grover Cleveland. Rock Springs, Wyoming were
massacred and burned out of their homes. Thirty-one Chinese miners in Hell’s
Canyon, Oregon were brutally robbed and killed becoming a part of many mob
violence movements against the Chinese in the late nineteenth century.180 All of
these targeted attacks call came from anti-Chinese racism and were easily
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focused onto the bodies of the Chinese who wore their queues either for security
or self-identity purposes. This makes it impossible to deny how that hairstyle
operated as an engine to “unnecessarily isolate and exclude the Chinese from
full participation in [an American] society.”181 By being barred from this full
participation, Chinese men whose masculinity was further disabled, making their
Chinese masculinity through queue wearing markers to become victims of further
violence.
With Exclusion being passed the story of the Chinese in the United States
did not simply end. Robert Chao Romero connects the relationship of the
Chinese diaspora experience from Mexico with that of the US. Romero defines a
diaspora as “the scattering and migration of minority groups who have a common
ancestral homeland, reside in several foreign areas, share a common culture,
hold similar aspirations and beliefs, and maintain some kind of linkage with the
homeland.”182 This definition allows for a more multinational narrative to
incorporate experiences of the Chinese, especially in disrupting any
preconceived notions that the Chinese experience within Mexico began in 1882
to circumvent the American exclusion law, though a large influx came for this
reason. The experience of the Chinese in Mexico occurred in the 1600s due to
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the globalization of the Spanish transcontinental trade and beyond.183 This
beyond aspect was the “coolie trade” where “coolie has no legal definition but is
a pejorative term that is affiliated with low status workers from China and India”
numbering “8,190,815” during the nineteenth and twentieth century.184 Due to
Mexico’s proximity to the United States, the Chinese migrants that came to
Mexico did not have an easier experience than their counterparts whose
destination was the US. On the contrary, they experienced extreme resistance
that was on par if not greater than the Sinophobia given in the United States.
As economic hardships hit the Mexican population, the competition with
Chinese laborers saw the rise of anti-Chinese sentiments that paralleled those in
the United States. Print journalism became one of the most effective means of
transferring ideas of anti-Chinese sentiments. Newspapers such as Gaceta
Internacional, La Libertad, and El Monitor Republicano would publish works
discouraging any race mixture that occurred such as in Peru and Cuba because
“they will produce a generation in Mexico whose quality we will have to leave to
the judgement of ethnographers.”185
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The intensity of the violence that occurred onto Chinese migrants occurred
mostly within the Mexican Revolution period of 1911 – 1917. In one example,
followers of Francisco Madero named maderistas would “slaughter half of
[Torreón] Chinese population and was deemed an act of race hatred executed
with savage ferocity.”186 Violence accompanied by print and musical works such
as Eduardo Tavo’s “Los Chinos” provides insight into the “othering” of the
Chinese male.
There goes the angry mob
So pay close attention
Only God knows what will Happen
Here comes the big news
I don’t know what will happen
But there will be no more silk outfits [Chinese clothing]
I am saying this in reference to many young women
Young women of Mazatlán.
Go look for your way out
Because soon there will be none left.
It started with a few Chinese
That had their stores closed down
And all of the women who did business with them
Cried all night
Many say that I am lying
Because I am telling the truth
They will fall in love with a Mexican
Only on rare occasions
Many Mexican women love the Chinese
Because they have no shame
And they aren’t ashamed to make a Chinese bun in their hair.
They both make the braid together
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Then they go to the mirror
With their Chinese at their side
And one asks the other
Who did a better job fixing their hair
All Mexican women that love a Chinese man
Should be ashamed
And without hesitation
Should be shunned by all the people of Mexico
I say this because many women of Mexico
Dirty women
For the love of money
They Make themselves less than a woman of China.
I am leaving now, I am saying farewell
I am not from this area
But when they find you kissing a Chinese man
You will remember me.187

Together with the poem “El destierro de los chino” or translated as “The
Banishment of the Chinese.”
If the government lets them, they will swamp our nation…
It is urgent to take steps
So that Arabs and Chinese
Don’t overrun our country….
Gentlemen, in your homes,
Which of your household products come
From these two races?
They haven’t made a discovery
Paying with Chinese money.
They’ve only come to ruin
The female kind.
That is the best thing they have done,
The dog-faced Chinese.
And that’s why we ask
187
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For the exile of the Chinese.
It is necessary that somebody takes notice
With care and attention
So that those wretched Chinese
Don’t breed in our nation….
The women that make a union with the Chinese….
Know no shame
Because they are staining the nation….
Pray to God, man from China,
With all your heart
That they don’t come and lynch you
If the revolution comes188

These two works present a common critique of Chinese immigrants which
was to feminize them by comparing them to women since “they both braid the
hair together.”189 When the feminization of Chinese males did not deter the
interracial marriage of Mexican women to Chinese men, opponents would attack
both parties. They would publish cartoons depicting women as wives or
concubines to a Chinese man, and the return to his homeland was not desirable,
implying that suicide is more amicable.190 Looking at diasporas abroad, insight is
gained from the experiences that contact with the Westernized world had on the
Chinese who went abroad. In experiencing the hostility and ridicule by these
modernized societies, those that frequently or at least once returned home truly
felt marginalized, and the common action taken to express the dissatisfaction
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was in the removal of their queues. Regardless of whether these individuals went
to Japan, The United States, or Mexico, the cutting of queues was the common
path taken by revolutionary minded individuals to free them of the disabling
aspect imposed on them.

The Zhang Xun Restoration
Zhang Xun (1854 – 1923), also stylized as Chang Hsun was a warlord and
General during the late Qing and the early Republican period. He was one of the
many generals who served under Yuan Shikai when he was the leader of the
Beiyang Army and later president of the republic. The most distinct physical
characteristic of Zhang was in his presentation, and the actions he took in his
attempted restoration of Emperor Puyi to the throne. Zhang Xun is known
colloquially as the “pigtail general” primarily for his refusal to cut off his queue
following the establishment of the Republic of China.191 In addition, his military
mandate to his troops was that they too must retain their queues, becoming the
rare sight of a queue wearing military society in a queue less China. Zhang Xun
was situated in a paradox, where his loyalty was split between his career of
servitude to the Qing who remained behind the walls of the forbidden city in
Beijing, and Yuan Shikai. Zhang himself remembers this loyalty split where he
stated, “I cannot show ingratitude for what I owe Yüan [Yuan]; I cannot forget the
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duty of a subject to his sovereign. If Yüan [Yuan] does no wrong to the imperial
court, he will never be wronged by me.”192 The death of Yuan Shikai in 1916 left a
power vacuum where Zhang Xun would become “free” from his loyalty to Yuan
and to fully serve his imperial monarch.193
The British diplomat Reginald Fleming Johnston, who would later become
an influential tutor to Puyi recalls in his autobiography the memory of his friend
Sir Charles Eliot. Eliot told Johnston that “when the restoration took place… [he
was astonished] when awakening in his room in the Hotel De Péking he found
the city decked with dragon flags.”194 That day the pigtail general had left behind
most of his army and only came into the city with a small force. Zhang was free
to finally express his deep loyalty to the throne, evident by his queue worn even
during Yuan’s reign, and even published a proclamation on his restoration. Lured
with the empty promises of local civil and military leaders, Zhang aired what he
believed to be the sufferings that the people experienced under the fractured
Republican government. Zhang’s public telegram stated,
“Republicanism is the source of all evil… It can thus be seen that
heaven has smiled on the Ch’ing dynasty by conferring His Majesty
with unusual wisdom so he might be able to rise at the proper
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moment to stop disorder…. On this day we have jointly
memorialized His Imperial Majesty to again ascend the throne to
establish the foundation of the country and to consolidate the minds
of the people.”195
Zhang’s play at a restoration was part of a larger group of five factions
wanting to return China to an imperial system, of which his faction were “old
bureaucrats who composed of old Ch’ing [Qing] Officials who continued to serve
in the new republican government.”196 Ho Man Chan theorized that Zhang’s
reasoning for supporting the Qing even through the 1911 revolution, Yuan
Shikai’s Presidency, and later monarchy due to his special favor from the
Empress Dowager in 1901. This is because as Ho Man Chan explains, “Chang
Hsun [Zhang Xun] was granted special honors by the imperial family, and his
troops became part of the imperial guard… [rising] rapidly and became a high
official”197
Puyi recalls himself being coached prior to his face-to-face meeting with
the General before his meeting on June 16, 1917. Puyi asked “is he the Chang
Hsun [Zhang Xun] who refuses to cut off his queue?”198 to which his tutor Liang
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Ting-Fen would verify that this was indeed the identity of Zhang Xun. The
eagerness of both tutor Liang and others within the Forbidden City in favor of a
restoration provide a brief insight into the minds of the remaining Qing court. In
addition, those within the Forbidden City wished to bestow honors upon the one
who returned the emperor to his “dragon throne.” Puyi recalled in his meeting in
the appearance noting “I was somewhat disappointed in his looks…I noticed,
however, that he did in fact have a queue.”199 Then on July 1, 1917, the general
had returned to the palace to “bring Your majesty back to your throne, to rule. It
is the restoration of the Great Ch’ing Dynasty.”200 The citizenry outside the
forbidden city in Beijing (then called Peking) saw a flood of support for the
emperor. Everywhere was “Ch’ing [Qing] court robes which had disappeared for
a few years appeared on the streets. It was as if the dead had stepped from their
coffins in their burial robes.”201 Though originally pressured by the police in the
city to bring out support for the restoration and the emperor, the population was
also lock step in favor of the monarchy. Johnston himself writes “Peking [Beijing],
for centuries accustomed to be the seat of a royal court, had never ceased to be
monarchist.”202
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This insight that Johnston provides offers a brief glimpse into a snapshot
period of crisis that was surrounding the restoration movement. The restoration
movement was more than a placement of the Qing emperor back on his throne.
The movement itself outlined already existing conflictions within the chaotic
period of the early republic. By noting that the capital city had sentiments that
were in favor of the monarchy provides a ripple into the traditional narratives of a
republican fervor amongst the citizenry. This challenges any national narrative
that the masses readily threw aside feelings of loyalty to China’s imperial past.
The amount of support that the surrounding population in Beijing may not
have been entirely linked by loyalty to the Qing. Enduring the tumultuous period
under the Republican government, especially the infighting between Yuan and
Sun Yat-sen’s loyalist. This infighting caused further turmoil, leading individuals
to not only have choose between the Qing and republican forces, but also
factions between republican forces. In addition, several members of the
population no longer had queues, either from forced cuts by the police and
barber patrols in the early republican days or from the people on their own
fruition by the time of the restoration. Queue wearing though shown to have been
an invented tradition to some, it is clear that queue signaled the last breath of the
Qing with the failed restoration, especially since the general leading the
restoration wore one himself. For the Beijing population, “theatrical supply
houses were besieged with requests for artificial queues made out of
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horsehair.”203 This request for horsehair queues is clear testament to lack of
queues in the city, since that no person could grow a full queue in such a short
time. The Restoration was easily defeated by premier Duan Qirui (1865 – 1935),
who not only overpowered Zhang’s forces but also ordered the first deployment
of the Chinese Air force, in which the Forbidden City itself was indeed struck and
would force Zhang to flee to the Dutch legation and abandon the restoration
movement.204
With the restoration abandoned, ultimately any chances of a true and
meaningful revival of the Qing dynasty were lost. Just as quickly as the public
wardrobe surrounding the restoration of old imperial traditions was reimplemented, they too went. Supporters and masterminds behind the restoration
quickly saved face, where Kang Youwei and Prince Zaitao (1887 – 1970) the
half-brother of Emperor Puyi, visited the American diplomat Paul S. Reinsch at
his home to explain that he “was not a reactionary, but was aiming only for
progress under the monarchial form, which he considered most suitable to

203

Puyi, From Emperor to Citizen, 68.

204

Rhoads, Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late
Qing and Early Republican China, 1861 - 1928, 241. The mobilization of the
Chinese Air Force over the Forbidden City to defeat the Restoration Movement of
Zhang Xun implies the seriousness the Republican forces viewed a restoration.
This was the second serious monarchial movement in a short time. The use of
the air force also shows the modernization of military forces, especially since the
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China.”205 In addition, Reinsch conversed with the two men and was impressed
with what he observed, being “an Imperial family maintaining traditions of empire
in the midst of a republic, an emperor continuing to reside in the Imperial Palace,
a neighbour of the republican President in his residence, and yet no desire to
enter again into politics and to grasp the sovereign power!”206 While general
Zhang was in the Dutch legation, his remaining troops held out for as long as
possible. Their goal was not one of monarchial restoration but of individual
financial gain. Their plan was to maintain an armed resistance long enough for
republican forces to offer better payment for their surrender. Reinsch witnessed
the payment of Zhang’s troops that held out, noting the foresight of the
restoration troops that they would instead of being wiped out they’d be paid off.
Zhang’s troops were paid “eighty dollars each” and “by the 15 th of July Chang
Hsun’s [Zhang Xun] troops, deprived of their arms and their pigtails, had left
Peking with their money, and were on their way to their rural homes in
Shantung.”207 Reinsch saw these soldiers who were famously named as the
“pigtail army” under the “pigtail general” deprived of their braid and sent back
home.
The consequence of Zhang’s soldiers in their role of the restoration was
neither imprisonment nor death. These soldiers were “saved” from their imperial
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past by having their queues removed and joined their “modern” citizens. This
removal of the queues of the military wing under General Zhang limited the few
remaining queues to those belonging within the Forbidden City. Reinsch was
impressed with the traditions surrounding the imperial family, and the emperor
was the ceremonial head of the imperial family. While the restoration came and
went, Puyi would still wear his queue, one of the diminishing traditions still
practiced in China from the dynastic age outside of Manchuria. This would
however become short lived.
Emperor Puyi’s experiences in the Forbidden City provide a lens into the
real experiences of an imperial tradition. Puyi recalls that his father, Prince Chun,
“did not reject things that the old officials regarded as strange and improper
contraptions. He was the first of the princes to have a motorcar or to install a
telephone in his house. His household were the first to have their queues cut off,
and he was the first of the princes and the nobility to wear Western clothing.”208
Puyi retained a western tutor, Johnston, who would go on to become one of his
lifelong and close friends. As a youth, Puyi appeared to be highly impressionable
but also strong willed in his own views, influenced by events within and outside
the Forbidden City.
Puyi characterized his life in the Republican Period as absurd, “because at
a time when China was called a republic and mankind had advanced into the

208

Puyi, From Emperor to Citizen, 22.

140

twentieth century, I was still living the life of an emperor, breathing the dust of the
nineteenth century.”209 One particular liberating breath that Puyi took was when
he finally removed his own queue in 1922. He had cut his queue on his own free
will, though not without external influence from his western tutor, Johnston, and
also the frequent reading of New Youth. In his own autobiography, Puyi states,
“A mere remark by Johnston that Chinese queues were pigtails was enough for
me to cut mine off.”210 Johnston recalls this event through a slightly different
perspective.
The emperor had several times expressed his desire to dispense
with this [the queue] ornament, but in spite of the fact that all his
uncles and other members of the imperial family had got rid of
theirs, he was told as a representative and head of the Manchu
race, he must show his respect for Manchu traditions by adhering
to his own… [he] retired to another room, took up a pair of scissors
and cut off his queue with his own hands.211
The minor act of Puyi cutting off his queue brought greater historical significance
to not only an imperial but also a modern China. The queue being severed from
the emperor in one of the most conservative areas within republican China fully
realized the revolutionary spirit of anti-Manchu practices. The living queue would
fade to history with the few remaining queues disappearing over time. From the
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Shunzhi emperor to Puyi, the queue both entered and left Chinese tradition
through monologic imposition.

Conclusion
The queue hairstyle that came from Manchu customs was not a Chinese
hairstyle. It was through generational wearing that the queue came to be adopted
into a Chinese identity by Han individuals to become an invented tradition.
Rooted in cultural heritage from the Jurchen tribes, Manchu and Han continued
to have a fragile relationship, owing to an ethnic displacement of a minority group
ruling over a majority population. The stakes between losing one’s life over
wearing a non-queue hairstyle continued to play a role into the development of a
pre-modern Chinese identity. The societal acceptance of wearing a queue
combined with a Confucian society that practiced ancestral worship eventually
molded queue wearing into an individual’s identity. The body was the canvas that
illustrated this identity, showing that hair continued to play an important role in a
Chinese identity from at least the twelfth century. As ideas of anti-Manchu and
Ming-loyalism resurfaced due to rebellions and hostile experiences in diasporas,
revolutionaries found the common link for a power shift to place the Han majority
back in control.
As these revolutionaries abroad experienced marginalization by Western
nations and Japan, anti-Manchu thought intensified. Overseas the Chinese male
was racialized to become inseparable from their Manchu leaders. In China, there
were clear distinctions between groups, where Manchus held their position at the
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top of the multi-ethnic empire and all other groups below them. For the Han
Chinese abroad, they were racialized grouped into a singular unit where the
West did not differentiate them. Not only did the Chinese workers and students
experience racism, they also experienced harassment based on the host
countries established gender roles. This point of frustration would fuel the drive of
revolutionaries to create a Han ethno-state once more, where the movement
embodied anti-Manchu sentiments with elements of Ming-loyalism. While back
home, the message conveyed was the need for a republic, and the citizens of
this republic would no longer wear queues. The problem with the narrative that
these revolutionaries proposed was that the queue was no longer a simple
identifier of subservience to the Manchus. The centuries of queue wearing
became ingrained into enough individuals’ sense of identity so that when the
1911 revolution came, the queue was not rejected immediately as expected. This
is further emphasized by the need to create a queue cutting campaign enacted
by Yuan and other revolutionaries to expeditive a process of removed queues in
China that they believed should be immediate. Zhang Xun’s attempted
restoration saw his soldiers join the republic with a haircut, as did the larger
population either willingly or against their will thanks to these queue-cutting
efforts.
The diaspora experience saw Chinese individuals become targets of
attacks of their person and property. The queue marked the Chinese male body
for harassment, and with these attacks came racialized isolation and
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discrimination of Western societies. Laborers and students experienced this
racialized isolation and even then, refused to remove the queue even in death.
Those that had, resorted to wearing false queues in a ritualistic practice of
Confucian ancestral reverence, demonstrating the queues adoption as an
invented tradition. When Emperor Puyi cut his queue in 1922, it brought the end
of the queue question for good.
Over a century passed since Puyi removed his queue in 1922 and China
today has donned a shorter hairstyle for less time than the queue had in Chinese
tradition. It is no accident that Manchu history has not been fondly regarded in
the annals of Chinese history, where the conflict with foreign powers in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century overshadowed the accomplishments that
are owed to the Qing. The Manchu dynasty is regarded as a failure, and their
removal from central power along with the queues came through the coordinated
efforts of Han ethnic revolutionaries. Reform movements from pro-Qing officials
had already recognized the need to be lax in enforcement of the queue, and yet it
was mainly those individuals with overseas marginalized experiences that
willingly removed their queues before the revolution. While the queues did
disappear after the revolution, it took the concentrated queue-cutting brigades to
remove queues from a republican society. The result of these queue removals
was a hairstyle that faded to history, along with the Qing dynasty as China fully
entered a modern period.
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